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ABSTRACT 
A behavioral approach studying inventory ordering decisions in Newsvendor settings dates back to the 
early 2000s. Two systematic biased behavioral patterns have been identified since: a pull-to-center 
effect, or the tendency to order too many costly (low-safety stock) products and too few cheap (high-
safety stock) products relative to the optimal stock level; and a demand chasing bias, or the tendency 
to adjust inventory ordering quantities towards prior demand realizations. Through three essays, this 
dissertation extends behavioral research in Newsvendor settings by exploring decision making 
behavior in structurally similar decisions and testing two different debiasing strategies. Essay 1 
develops the Innovator model, an analog to the Newsvendor model for New Product Development 
projects, and explores project complexity level and resource allocation decision biases. This study 
finds that project complexity level and resource allocation decision biases resemble Newsvendor 
biases. Essay 2 proposes a debiasing mechanism that builds on cognitive dissonance theory to stress 
differences in items’ importance and safety stock levels in joint decisions as a way to debias 
Newsvendor ordering decisions for critical items. This study finds that joint consonant decision 
frameworks reduce to some extent biased Newsvendor ordering behavior, whereas joint dissonant 
decision frameworks increase it. Finally, essay 3 tests a Newsvendor extension that backlogs unmet 
demand and compares it to the traditional Newsvendor model that loses unmet demand. This study 
finds that backorders help achieving better inventory ordering decision making in terms of both profits 
and product availability relative to lost sales. 
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SOMMARIO 
Una prospettiva comportamentale per lo studio di decisioni d’inventario in strutture Newsvendor risale 
ai primi anni del 2000. Due comportamenti distorti sistematici sono stati identificati: l’effetto pull-to-
center, ovvero la tendenza a ordinare un numero eccessivo di prodotti costosi (low-safety stock) e 
troppo pochi di prodotti economici (high-safety stock) rispetto al livello d’inventario ottimale; e 
l’errore demand chasing, ovvero la tendenza ad aggiustare le decisioni d’inventario in base alla 
domanda dei periodi precedenti. In tre saggi, questa tesi amplia la letteratura comportamentale su 
strutture Newsvendor, esplorando il processo decisionale in strutture di decisioni simili e testando due 
strategie diverse di correzione degli errori. Il primo saggio sviluppa l’Innovator model, un analogo del 
Newsvendor model per progetti di sviluppo di nuovi prodotti, ed esplora errori nelle decisioni sul 
livello di complessità di un progetto e sull’allocazione delle risorse. Questo studio rivela che questi 
errori rispecchiano le distorsioni Newsvendor. Il secondo saggio propone un meccanismo di correzione 
degli errori che si basa sulla teoria della dissonanza cognitiva e che evidenzia differenze 
nell’importanza e nel livello di safety stock degli oggetti per decisioni congiunte d’acquisto. In questo 
modo possono essere ridotti gli errori Newsvendor per decisioni d’acquisto critiche. Questo studio 
rivela che decisioni comuni concordanti riducono in qualche misura il comportamento d’inventario 
Newsvendor distorto, mentre decisioni comuni dissonanti lo aumentano. In fine, il terzo saggio esplora 
un’estensione del Newsvendor model che considera la domanda non servita accumulata degli ordini 
arretrati e la confronta con il Newsvendor model tradizionale che invece non considera la domanda non 
servita. Questo studio rivela che gli ordini arretrati aiutano a prendere migliori decisioni d’inventario 
sia in termini di profitti sia di disponibilità del prodotto rispetto al Newsvendor model tradizionale. 
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NOTES ON SOFTWARE AND DOCUMENTATION 
The experimental Newsvendor settings in chapters 2 and 3 were programmed and run by the author in 
Forio Business Simulations (www.forio.com). The experimental Newsvendor settings in chapter 4 
were programmed and run by the author in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The data coming from the 
experiments were compiled in Microsoft Office Excel version 2007. 
Bootstrap confidence intervals were computed by the author in Stata/MP version 11.2. Wilcoxon 
Rank-Sum and Signed-Rank tests were done manually by the author in Microsoft Excel version 2007. 
Regression models were run by the author in Stata/MP version 11.2. 
Forio and z-Tree source codes and data files are available upon request for documentation 
purposes. 
 
 
 
 
vi 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First of all, I want to express my gratitude to Paulo, a wonderful advisor and an even more wonderful 
human being. Thanks for having given me the opportunity to come to Lugano and work under your 
supervision. Many thanks also for all the support you gave me and the time we spent together 
developing ideas. Your brightness and clarity of thinking are things I aspire to have. Thanks also for 
all the confidence you placed on me. Last but not least, thanks for having treated me with such 
kindness and respect. They way you approach and treat people is remarkable and is something I strive 
for. 
I want to thank Nitin for all his support in developing some of the ideas expressed in this 
dissertation. Many thanks also to Karen for her sharp comments on how to improve further the 
dissertation. I want to thank also both Paulo and Nitin for their advices to develop further my 
academic career. I also want to express my gratitude to all IMA Faculty. All the training and support I 
received from you helped me sharpening my intellectual skills. Many thanks also to Sebastián, 
Mohammad and Gloria for all their support in running some of the experiments reported in this 
dissertation. Finally, thanks also to all the administrative staff at USI who have helped me. 
IMA is a great workplace. I want to thank all the colleagues and friends I made here. Min, Soorjith, 
Karthik, Pooya, Chanchal, Marco, Martina, Sayed, Alessio, Mohammad, Zoltan, Rebeka, Margarita, 
Sebastián, Manos, Ivona, Marco (the new one), and Stefania (not IMA, but pretty close)… Thank you 
for all the shared words, the support you all gave me and your kindness whenever I requested your 
help or advice. 
I want to thank also Santiago and Claire for accommodating me when I first got here. Without your 
help I do not know what would have become of my LugAno experience. 
LugAno… I made really good friends here whom I will never forget. I want to thank all of you for 
having given me the opportunity to share with you and made my last four years truly rewarding. Many 
thanks also for all the fun we had together here at Lugano and all over Switzerland and Europe. Those 
are times I will carry always with me. 
vii 
 
©tagxedo.com 
 
Last, but most importantly, I want to expresses my most sincere and deepest gratitude to my family 
and La Tatis. You took and stood the worst part of my four years here. I would not be here if it were 
not for my family and all the support and confidence they have given me in pursuing an academic 
career. You were and are always there for me. And to La Tatis… What can I say? Almost 9000 km 
apart and 6-7 hours time difference were things you dealt with much better than I did. I thank you for 
your patience and love. You taught me a lot about character these four years and made me a better 
person even though sometimes it does not seem so. I am deeply indebted to you mi Ñatica. I love you. 
 
 
 
 
viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1. OVERVIEW 1 
1.2. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 2 
CHAPTER 2: AMBITIOUS DESIGN GOALS AND STRETCHED RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION: INVESTIGATION OF MANAGERIAL BIASES UNDER INNOVATION 
UNCERTAINTY 5 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 6 
2.2. INNOVATION UNCERTAINTY  8 
2.3. THE INNOVATOR MODEL 9 
2.4. RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND LABORATORY EXPERIMENT 12 
2.4.1. Innovators behavior 12 
2.4.2. Experimental design 14 
2.4.3. Experimental procedure 15 
2.5. RESULTS 16 
2.5.1. Pull-to-center effect 16 
2.5.2. Threshold chasing bias 20 
2.6. DISCUSSION 23 
CHAPTER 3: IMPACT OF JOINT DECISIONS AND COGNITIVE DISSONANCE ON 
PREPOSITIONING (NEWSVENDOR) DECISIONS 29 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 30 
3.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 33 
3.2.1. Prepositioning of emergency supplies as a Newsvendor problem 33 
3.2.2. Newsvendor’s pull-to-center effect 34 
3.2.3. Joint decision making as a debiasing mechanism 36 
3.3. LABORATORY EXPERIMENT 41 
3.3.1. Basic design 41 
3.3.2. Notation 42 
3.3.3. Treatments 42 
3.3.4. Experimental procedure 43 
3.4. RESULTS 45 
3.4.1. Newsvendor biases in inventory prepositioning decisions 45 
3.4.2. Baseline results: separate decision treatments 47 
3.4.3. Cognitive dissonant joint treatment’s results 49 
ix 
3.4.4. Cognitive consonant joint treatment’s results 52 
3.4.5. Summary of results 54 
3.5. DISCUSSION 55 
CHAPTER 4: INVENTORY ORDERING DECISIONS IN A SINGLE ECHELON: THE 
EFFECT OF BACKORDERS 63 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 63 
4.2. NEWSVENDOR PROBLEM WITH BACKORDERS 67 
4.2.1. Normative implications 67 
4.2.2. Behavioral implications 70 
4.3. LABORATORY EXPERIMENT 72 
4.3.1. Experimental design 73 
4.3.2. Experimental procedure 74 
4.4. RESULTS 76 
4.4.1. Normative hypotheses 76 
4.4.2. Behavioral hypotheses 79 
4.4.3. Robustness check to outliers 83 
4.5. DISCUSSION 84 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 91 
5.1.  CONTRIBUTIONS 91 
5.2. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 92 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 95 
 
 
 
 
x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1. Average complexity level and resource allocation behaviors 17 
Figure 2.2. Average complexity level and resource allocation adjustment behaviors period-to-
period 21 
Figure A2.2.1. Sample of game screen 28 
Figure 3.1. Average inventory prepositioning behaviors in separate decision treatments 49 
Figure 3.2. Average inventory prepositioning behaviors in dissonance-related treatments 51 
Figure 3.3. Average inventory prepositioning behaviors in consonance-related treatments 53 
Figure A3.2.1. Sample of game screen 60 
Figure 4.1. Optimality behavior to increasing values of the purchasing cost c 68 
Figure 4.2. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of average inventory ordering behaviors 77 
Figure 4.3. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of average order adjustment behaviors after a 
shortage 80 
Figure A4.2.1. Sample of game screen 90 
 
 
 
 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1. Parallel between the Newsvendor and the Innovator models 12 
Table 2.2. Treatments, notation, and number of participants 16 
Table 2.3. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of average complexity level and resource 
allocation behaviors 18 
Table 2.4. Fixed-effects panel regression of learning to avoid the pull-to-center effect 20 
Table 2.5. Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests of threshold chasing bias 22 
Table 2.6. Fixed-effects panel regression of learning to avoid the threshold chasing bias 23 
Table 3.1. Treatments, notation, and number of participants 44 
Table 3.2. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of average inventory prepositioning behaviors 47 
Table 3.3. Summary of hypothesis tests 55 
Table 4.1. Treatments, notation, and number of participants 75 
Table 4.2. Regression of larger inventory system effect in low-safety stock conditions 78 
Table 4.3. Regression of larger inventory system shortage effect in low-safety stock 
conditions 81 
Table 4.4. Fixed-effects panel regression of misperceptions of feedback 82 
 
 
 
 
xii 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
Appendix 2.1. Sample of written instructions (CH) 26 
Appendix 2.2. Sample of game screen (CH) 28 
Appendix 3.1. Sample of written instructions (joint decision treatment) 58 
Appendix 3.2. Sample of game screen (T6) 60 
Appendix 3.3. Statistical tests 60 
Appendix 4.1. Sample of written instructions (BH) 87 
Appendix 4.2. Sample of game screen (BH) 90 
 
 
 
 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. OVERVIEW 
The Newsvendor model is an inventory ordering decision making model under demand uncertainty. 
The model dates back to Edgeworth (1888), who considered the amount of cash to keep at a bank as a 
product whose inventory should be controlled to satisfy random cash withdrawals from depositors, and 
to Arrow et al. (1951), who incorporated demand uncertainty to the study of inventory control 
policies. The model captures the problem a manager faces when she has to order a product that has to 
be sold during a season without knowing the product’s demand for that season. It assumes that the 
item perishes before the next season and that unmet demand is lost. Accordingly, when the manager 
orders more than the demand, she must dispose of the remaining stock at a loss. And when the 
manager orders less than the demand, she loses sales opportunities. It is well-known that the solution 
of the problem is a base stock or order-up-to policy that balances the costs of ordering too little against 
the costs of ordering too much (Cachon and Terwiesch, 2009). 
Despite the model’s long history, a behavioral approach to study Newsvendor ordering decisions is 
fairly more recent, dating back to Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), who studied how individuals make 
Newsvendor ordering decisions in a controlled laboratory (lab) experiment. Schweitzer and Cachon’s 
(2000) seminal study found that individuals make biased inventory ordering decisions. In particular, 
they ordered less than the optimum when the costs associated with the ordered item and the demand 
process called for larger orders (high-safety stock or high-profit setting), whereas they ordered more 
than the optimum when the costs associated with the ordered item and the demand process called for 
smaller orders (low-safety stock or low-profit setting); this bias is also known as the pull-to-center 
effect. In addition, the authors also found that when individuals did change inventory ordering 
decisions period to period, the changes tended to be in direction of the prior demand realization; this 
bias is also known as demand chasing. 
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The pull-to-center effect and demand chasing have been replicated in subsequent Newsvendor 
experiments. The pull-to-center effect has been proved robust to extended experience (Benzion et al., 
2010; Bolton et al., 2012), sharpened payoff differentials (Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al., 
2008; Feng et al., 2011), and improved outcome feedback (Bostian et al., 2008; Lurie and 
Swaminathan, 2009), among others. Demand chasing has been proved robust to demand distribution 
(Benzion et al., 2008), non-operations frames (Kremer et al., 2010), and financial risk-taking 
behaviors (de Véricourt et al., 2013), among others. 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on Behavioral Operations Management (Bendoly et 
al., 2006; Bendoly et al., 2010; Gino and Pisano, 2008; Loch and Wu, 2007) by looking at biased 
Newsvendor ordering behavior from three perspectives. First, it seeks to understand if insights from 
the Newsvendor model and biased Newsvendor ordering behavior can be translated to structurally 
similar decisions, in particular to complexity level (or scope) and resource allocation decisions in New 
Product Development (NPD) projects under innovation uncertainty. Second, it examines if a new 
debiasing mechanism that builds on Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory can effectively 
debias and strengthen the pull-to-center effect. Finally, it builds on an existing extension of the 
Newsvendor model to the case of backorders (Bulinskaya, 1964) and examines whether backlogging 
unmet demand instead of losing sales can effectively debias inventory ordering behavior. 
1.2. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is composed of three essays that explore biased decision making behavior in 
Newsvendor settings. Each essay was written to eventually be sent for publication. Hence, there is 
some repetition of the Newsvendor setting and some literature review in each essay. However, each 
essay addresses a different aspect of biased Newsvendor decision making behavior. The ensuing three 
chapters present the three essays with their corresponding findings. Lastly, a final chapter presents 
concluding remarks and discusses limitations and opportunities for future research. A brief description 
of the three essays and their findings is given below. 
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In the first essay (chapter 2), we develop a stylized model of NPD decision making under 
innovation uncertainty. Assuming a single stage-gate innovation pipeline under a single uncertainty 
source, the developed model is analogous to the Newsvendor model. We operationalize the model 
under project complexity level and resource uncertainty separately and test it in a lab experiment. We 
find that project complexity level and resource allocation biases resembled those observed in 
Newsvendor experiments. In particular, we observe the pull-to-center effect, i.e., individuals tend to 
under react when innovation costs and uncertainty call for ambitious scopes or more resources, 
whereas they tend to overreact when innovation costs and uncertainty call for less ambitious scopes or 
fewer resources. In addition, we also observe the threshold (demand) chasing bias, i.e., individuals 
tend to chase uncertainty thresholds realized in previous innovation efforts. These results suggest that 
NPD managers may under perform in demanding markets, limiting their a priory likelihood of 
success; and over perform in less challenging markets, a priory dedicating more resources than those 
required for success. 
In the second essay (chapter 3), we study joint decision making as a potential debiasing mechanism 
for the pull-to-center effect. In particular, we join or bundle to items that differ in their perceived 
importance and safety stock condition. Building on cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Simon et 
al., 1995) arguments, we pose that bundling a high-importance high-safety stock item with a low-
importance low-safety stock item (consonance) reduces the bias for the high-importance item. 
Alternatively, we pose that bundling a high-importance low-safety stock item with a low-importance 
high-safety stock item (dissonance) increases the bias for the high-importance item. We test this new 
debiasing mechanism in a lab experiment in which we compare joint inventory ordering decisions to 
corresponding baseline inventory ordering decisions (no bundling). We find support for our 
predictions, suggesting that joint consonant and dissonant decision frameworks may help achieving 
higher product availability (or customer service satisfaction) and/or profits for critical items. 
Finally, in the third essay (chapter 4), I test behaviorally Bulinskaya’s (1964) Newsvendor 
extension to the case of backorders and compare it to the traditional lost sales Newsvendor model. 
Consistent with a theoretical comparison of both inventory systems, I find that backorders drive 
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individuals’ inventory ordering quantities upwards compared to lost sales. In addition, consistent with 
reference dependence and misperceptions of feedback, I also find that individuals react to shortages in 
a stronger manner when unmet demand is backlogged than when is lost and underweight backorders 
when making inventory ordering decisions, respectively. These results suggest that suppliers may 
benefit in terms of product availability (or customer service satisfaction) and/or profits by backlogging 
rather than losing unmet demand. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AMBITIOUS DESIGN GOALS AND STRETCHED RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION: INVESTIGATION OF MANAGERIAL BIASES 
UNDER INNOVATION UNCERTAINTY 
(with Paulo Gonçalves and Nitin Joglekar) 
 
ABSTRACT 
We develop a stylized decision making model to inform decision making in New Product 
Development (NPD) under innovation uncertainty. The model incorporates the possibility of setting 
ambitious (or, alternatively, less aggressive) design goals or stretched (or, alternatively, less restricted) 
resource allocations. Delivering on these goals enhances market payback, but also creates product 
launch risks. Our setup is analogous to the Newsvendor model for ordering inventory. We 
operationalize and test the model experimentally under complexity and resource uncertainty 
separately. Results show that decision making biases resemble those observed in Newsvendor settings. 
On the one hand, we observe the pull-to-center effect; that is, individuals tend to under react when 
innovation costs and uncertainty call for either more resources or ambitious scopes, and they tend to 
overreact when innovation costs and uncertainty call for either fewer resources or ambitious scopes. 
On the other hand, we also observe the threshold chasing bias; that is, individuals tend to chase 
uncertainty thresholds realized in previous innovation efforts. Findings suggest that NPD managers 
may underperform in demanding markets, limiting their a priory likelihood of success; and over 
perform in less challenging markets, a priory dedicating more resources than those required for 
success. 
Keywords: Behavioral Operations Management, Laboratory Experiments, Innovation Uncertainty, 
New Product Development, Newsvendor Biases, Newsvendor Model. 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
New Product Development projects face significant uncertainty impacting their success in the market 
place. Managing uncertainty to reduce the risk of project failure is a key challenge faced by NPD 
managers (Cooper, 2003). Uncertainty sources are diverse and include, among others: customer, 
technological, market, and resource uncertainty (Cooper, 2003; Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001; Moenaert 
and Souder, 1990; Mullins and Sutherland, 1998; Thomke, 2008). To the extent that information about 
the uncertainty sources is available and adequate —there is a list of possible events, their probabilities, 
and their impact on project payoff—, NPD managers can rely on traditional project management tools 
such as task scheduling and risk management to address them (Pich et al., 2002). Activity network 
techniques such as Critical Path Method (CPM) and Program Evaluation and Review Technique 
(PERT) have been widely used for decades for project planning and project management. Risk 
management, scenario-planning and simulation extend activity network techniques, by identifying 
possible but uncertain events and planning for them. 
However, information about the uncertainty sources is frequently incomplete or inaccurate. NPD 
managers are not aware of all possible unanticipated events (Schrader et al., 1993) and do not fully 
understand the impact that their decisions may have on project performance (Pich et al., 2002). 
Accordingly, empirical research suggests a number of approaches to manage projects in highly 
uncertain environments. For instance, research shows that iterative prototyping and testing can help 
NPD projects progress towards acceptable results (Lynn et al., 1996; Thomke, 1998). Alternatively, 
managers can work on parallel trials to develop multiple solutions, choosing the best one once their 
outcomes are observable (Beinhocker, 1999; Sobek et al., 1999). 
Similarly, analytical approaches suggest how to model information about the uncertainty sources in 
order to optimize a given project outcome. For instance, Pich et al. (2002) consider a general model 
that maps a network of activities and a set of influence factors to a project payoff. The uncertain nature 
of the set of influence factors and the complexity of the map structure make necessary to consider 
policies —instead of a pre-specified network of activities— that identify in advance a complete set of 
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actions which are triggered by signals. Under this approach, a policy is then optimal if it maximizes 
the conditional expected payoff given a signal. Following decision sciences, Loch and Terwiesch 
(2005) consider a model of preliminary information in which information is treated in the form of 
probabilities and outcomes. The model also considers events or aggregated set of outcomes and 
actions that the information receiving party takes. Knowing that earlier actions incur lower costs, but 
are associated with higher uncertainty, and later actions can use more information, but are more costly, 
the manager’s problem is then to time actions in the presence of uncertainty so as to minimize 
expected costs. 
Although these approaches seek to inform decision making under innovation uncertainty, they are 
too complex and hence derivation of optimal policies is extremely difficult, rendering difficult to 
quantitatively support managerial decisions (Loch and Terwiesch, 2005; Pich et al., 2002). In addition, 
these approaches have not been tested behaviorally to the best of our knowledge and hence a clear 
understanding of how managers behave under innovation uncertainty is lacking (Loch and Wu, 2007). 
Addressing such gaps, this work makes two contributions. First, it adapts the seminal Newsvendor 
model for perishable inventory to NPD decision making under innovation uncertainty. By drawing a 
parallel between NPD decision making under innovation uncertainty and Newsvendor decision 
making, we derive a foundational model, which we name the Innovator model, to suitably inform 
decision making in NPD under innovation uncertainty. Our simple model provides a normative 
solution for an NPD manager deciding on the complexity level (or scope) of a project and on its 
resource allocation under complexity and resource uncertainty, respectively. Second, it explores 
decision biases NPD managers may be prone to. Previous research on judgment and decision theory 
has shown that individuals are prone to a number of decision biases (Kahneman, 2003; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). Cooper (2003) recognizes that NPD managers face similar challenges to those 
faced by other individuals, which suggests that their decisions may deviate from optimum. By running 
decision experiments applying the Innovator model under either complexity or resource uncertainty, 
we show that NPD managers may be prone to the well-known pull-to-center effect and demand 
(threshold) chasing bias commonly observed in behavioral studies of the Newsvendor model. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides an explanation of innovation 
uncertainty, emphasizing endogenous uncertainty sources. Section 2.3 draws an analogy between 
decisions in NPD under innovation uncertainty and Newsvendor settings, developing an analog to the 
Newsvendor model, which we name the Innovator model. Based on behavioral studies of the 
Newsvendor model, section 2.4 develops a research hypothesis and presents the laboratory (lab) 
experiment designed to test the Innovator model under resource and complexity uncertainty separately. 
Section 2.5 presents the main results and hypothesis tests. Finally, section 2.6 summarizes the work 
and discusses the main findings, implications, limitations, and opportunities for future research. 
2.2. INNOVATION UNCERTAINTY 
Uncertainty is a prevalent issue in innovation. The NPD literature highlights some common sources of 
uncertainty: customer, technology, market, and resource uncertainty (Cooper, 2003; Krishnan and 
Ulrich, 2001; Moenaert and Souder, 1990; Mullins and Sutherland, 1998; Thomke, 2008). Customer 
uncertainty is related with the inability of customers to fully specify all of their needs because they 
either face uncertainty themselves or cannot articulate their needs on products that do not yet exist 
(Thomke, 2008). Technological uncertainty arises because there is a lack of knowledge about the 
availability and performance of new technology (Cooper, 2003). Market uncertainty is related with the 
absence of information about the market opportunities that a new technology offers (Mullins and 
Sutherland, 1998). And resource uncertainty is related with the absence of information about the 
human, financial, and technical resources needed to create the innovation (Cooper, 2003; Moenaert 
and Souder, 1990; Mullins and Sutherland, 1998). 
Customer uncertainty, technological uncertainty, and market uncertainty all originate from the 
external environment (Moenaert and Souder, 1990). Due to their exogenous nature, these sources of 
uncertainty are harder for NPD managers to control. In contrast, resource uncertainty originates 
internally and hence it is arguably easier for NPD managers to measure and control (Jauch and Kraft, 
1986). This is so even though resource uncertainty may be impacted by external sources of 
uncertainty. For instance, while significant market uncertainty may limit the amount of resources NPD 
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managers may choose to allocate in a specific market (Thomke, 2008), they still retain control over the 
decision. Hence, the Resource Innovator model deals initially with resource uncertainty. 
In addition, complexity has been identified as a central contributor to project uncertainty(Hobday, 
1998; Pich et al., 2002; Tatikonda and Rosenthal, 2000) and associated with the reasons why NPD 
projects are often late, over budget, or lacking scope (Kim and Wilemon, 2003; Tatikonda and 
Rosenthal, 2000). Kim and Wilemon (2003) summarize the different definitions of complexity 
provided in the NPD literature, defining it as the challenges posed by the different number of 
technologies/components/functions in development efforts and the nature of organizational tasks that 
individuals and organizations face in carrying out NPD programs. From this definition, one can 
arguably infer that complexity arises from within the organization, both from the characteristics of the 
product being developed (Griffin, 1997; Murmann, 1994) and from the different number of tasks that 
need to be carried out to develop the product (Tatikonda and Rosenthal, 2000). Because of its 
endogenous nature, complexity may be easier for NPD managers to control even though it may be 
exacerbated by external sources of uncertainty. For instance, significant customer uncertainty can lead 
to constantly changing product specifications, making it difficult for managers to assess the desired 
product functionality and total number of development tasks. Still, NPD managers retain control over 
the decision potentially addressing a subset of customer requirements. Hence, the Complexity 
Innovator model deals initially with complexity uncertainty. 
2.3. THE INNOVATOR MODEL 
In the Newsvendor model (Arrow et al., 1951), a manager places an order quantity q at unit cost w 
facing an uncertain demand D in a single selling season. Once D is realized, the manager sells each 
unit at price p > w. If q exceeds D, then D units are sold and q – D units can be salvaged for s < w. 
That is, there is a unit overage cost co = w – s. If D exceeds q, then q units are sold and the potential 
profit from selling D – q units is forgone. That is, there is a unit underage cost cu = p – w. For 
simplicity, and following previous Newsvendor experiments, we assume no salvage value. That is, co 
= w. In sum, the order quantity q results in a realized period profit: 
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where 
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is the mismatch cost when ordering q. The normative solution that minimizes mismatch cost equals 
the maximizer of profits. If D is a random variable with pdf f, the expected mismatch cost can be 
expressed as a function of the order quantity q: 
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 (2.3) 
 
It is well-known that the normative solution Q
*
 that minimizes expected mismatch cost is an order-
up-to or base-stock policy that balances overage and underage costs, which is characterized by the 
following expression: 
 
 (  )   
  
       
 (2.4) 
 
where F is D’s cdf. Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) define a product as a high-profit (or high-safety 
stock) product when F(Q
*) ≥ 1/2 and as a low-profit (or low-safety stock) product otherwise. 
Summarizing, the Newsvendor model is characterized by three main components —a single decision 
(q), an uncertain parameter (D), and a cost structure (co and cu)— and a relatively simple optimal 
policy that balances overage and underage costs given a distribution of the uncertain parameter. 
Assuming a single stage-gate innovation pipeline, the proposed Innovator model for NPD decision 
making under innovation uncertainty is characterized by the same structure. In NPD under complexity 
uncertainty, a manager decides on the complexity level C or scope of a project (e.g. the functionality 
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of a software program) before observing the functionality threshold CT the project must meet to be 
successful in the market (e.g. functionality the software must have at time of launch). Analogously, in 
NPD under resource uncertainty, a manager decides on the amount of resources R to allocate in a 
project (e.g. the number of engineer-hours with a fixed productivity in terms of tasks/hour) before 
knowing the total number of tasks RT the project will require before launch (e.g. planned work and 
unplanned rework to program all the functionality the software requires). 
Letting p be the unit revenue associated with a project and w the associated unit development cost, 
the cost structure of the Innovator model is analogous to that of the Newsvendor model. In the 
Complexity Innovator model, and following the Newsvendor logic, the project cost depends only on 
the decided complexity level of the project. That is, project cost is independent of the functionality 
threshold required for product success, and equals wC. A unit overage costs co = w is then incurred 
whenever the decided complexity level C is more than the functionality threshold CT required for 
product success (e.g. the software program has more functionality than required). That is, the 
organization builds more functionality than required for product success, incurring unnecessary costs 
for the extra work C – CT. In contrast, and again following the Newsvendor logic, project revenue 
depends on whether the project is successful. That is, project revenue depends on whether the project 
meets the functionality threshold, and equals (p – w)C if   ≤  T and (p – w)CT if C > CT. A unit 
underage cost cu = p – w is then incurred whenever C is less than the CT required for product success. 
That is, not all functionality is built and the product is launched lacking functionality, preventing the 
organization from realizing potential profits from CT – C. 
Similarly, in the Resource Innovator model, the project cost depends only on the amount of 
resources allocated or the number of tasks completed. That is, project cost is independent of the 
amount of resources necessary to complete all tasks the project will require before launch, and equals 
wR. A unit overage cost co = w is then incurred whenever the allocated resources R are more than 
enough to complete all required tasks RT (e.g. allocating 100 engineer-hours when 90 engineer-hours 
are enough to program all the software functionalities). That is, the organization allocates more 
resources than required to complete all tasks, incurring unnecessary cost for the extra resources R – RT. 
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In contrast, and again following the Newsvendor logic, project revenue depends on whether all 
required tasks are completed. That is, project revenue depends on whether all tasks the project will 
require before launch are completed, and equals (p – w)R if R ≤ RT and (p – w)RT if R > RT. A unit 
underage cost cu = p – w is then incurred whenever R is not enough to complete RT. That is, not all 
tasks are completed and the product is launched with defects, preventing the organization from 
realizing potential profits from RT – R. 
Assuming that NPD managers decide on C or R under the assumed cu and co and NPD 
organizations collect information about past NPD efforts to learn about the previous uncertainty 
sources CT or RT (McCarthy et al., 2006), the Newsvendor structure in (2.1)-(2.4) can inform 
complexity level or resource allocation decisions under innovation uncertainty, providing managers 
with a normative complexity level or resource allocation given by (2.4). 
Table 2.1 summarizes the parallel between the Newsvendor model and the proposed Complexity 
and Resource Innovator models. 
 
Table 2.1. Parallel between the Newsvendor and the Innovator models. 
 Newsvendor 
model 
Complexity 
Innovator model 
Resource 
Innovator model 
Decision q C R 
Uncertain 
parameter 
D CT RT 
Cost structure co, cu co, cu co, cu 
 
2.4. RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND LABORATORY EXPERIMENT 
2.4.1. Innovators behavior 
Lab experiments on the Newsvendor model have mainly reported two decision biases: level bias and 
adjustment bias. Level bias refers to individuals’ average tendency to order away from the normative 
order quantity (Rudi and Drake, 2011). It is commonly reported in terms of the pull-to-center effect, 
which refers to the average tendency of individuals to order between the normative solution and the 
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mean demand (Bostian et al., 2008). That is, individuals tend to order too few of high-profit products 
and too many of low-profit products (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000). 
In a seminal behavioral study of the Newsvendor model, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) found 
evidence of the pull-to-center effect in both high- and low-profit products. A number of other studies 
have provided further support for the effect, showing it is robust to the demand distribution (Benzion 
et al., 2008, 2010), sharpened payoff differentials addressing flat maximum concerns and their 
impediments to learning (Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al., 2008), and improved outcome 
feedback (Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al., 2008; Lurie and Swaminathan, 2009), among others. 
Given the structural similarity between the Newsvendor and both Complexity and Resource 
Innovators, it is then reasonable to expect complexity level and resource allocation behaviors 
consistent with the pull-to-center effect. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Complexity level decisions will fall between the mean functionality threshold 
and the optimal complexity level in both profit conditions. Similarly, resource 
allocation decisions will fall between the mean number of tasks that need to 
be completed before launch and the optimal resource allocation in both profit 
conditions. 
In addition, we do not have any reason to expect differences in complexity level and resource 
allocation behaviors in the same profit condition given the structural similarity between the 
Complexity and Resource Innovators in the same profit condition. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 2: In the same profit condition, complexity level behavior will be similar to 
resource allocation behavior. 
Adjustment bias refers to individuals’ average tendency to adjust order quantities period-to-period 
(Rudi and Drake, 2011). It is commonly reported in terms of the demand (threshold) chasing bias, 
which refers to the average tendency of individuals to adjust orders towards the prior demand 
realization (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000). That is, when individuals adjust orders period-to-period, 
they tend to do so more frequently towards than away from prior threshold realizations. 
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In the seminal behavioral study of the Newsvendor model, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) found 
also evidence of threshold chasing behavior in both high- and low-profit products. Threshold chasing 
behavior has been less studied than the pull-to-center effect; however, subsequent studies have also 
provided further support for the bias, showing it is robust to the demand distribution (Benzion et al., 
2008), non-operations frames (Kremer et al., 2010), and financial risk-taking behaviors(de Véricourt 
et al., 2013), among others. 
Given the structural similarity between the Newsvendor and both Complexity and Resource 
Innovators, it is then reasonable to expect complexity level and resource allocation adjustment 
behaviors consistent with the threshold chasing bias. This leads to the third hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Complexity level adjustments will be directed more frequently towards than 
away from prior functionality thresholds in both profit conditions. Similarly, 
Resource allocation adjustments will be directed more frequently towards 
than away from prior number of tasks that need to be completed before launch 
in both profit conditions. 
Unlike the pull-to-center effect, the threshold chasing bias does not have corresponding threshold 
chasing regions. Hence, and despite the structural similarity between the Complexity and Resource 
Innovators in the same profit condition, we do not make claims about the similarity in complexity 
level and resource allocation adjustment behaviors in the same profit condition. 
2.4.2. Experimental design 
Following previous Newsvendor experiments (Rudi and Drake, 2011; Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000), 
we set unit project revenue at p = 12 and manipulate unit development cost c. In particular, we set unit 
development cost for high-profit projects at c = 3, and for low-profit projects at c = 9. Following also 
previous Newsvendor experiments (e.g., Bolton and Katok, 2008; Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000), we 
consider uniformly distributed functionality thresholds    ~   (   1  ) and number of task to be 
completed R  ~   (   1  ). The distributions imply a mean or E[CT] = E[RT] = 50. All individuals 
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experienced realizations from the same set of threshold values, controlling for the impact of threshold 
realizations on decision making behavior. 
In the Resource Innovator individuals decide on the amount of resources to allocate, and they 
receive feedback on number of tasks. In this setting, the productivity of resources measures the 
number of tasks that can be completed per resource. For simplicity, we assume that the productivity of 
resources equals 1 task per resource. Hence, there is a straightforward conversion between allocated 
resources and number of tasks. For example, if an individual allocates 50 resource units, the number 
of tasks completed is 1 task/res  r e ∙ 5  res  r e  nits   5  tasks. 
The described parameterization implies a normative complexity level and allocation of resources of 
75 percent complexity level and engineer-hours in the high-profit Innovators, respectively, and a 
normative complexity level and allocation of resources of 25 percent complexity level and engineer-
hours in the low-profit Innovators, respectively. 
To explore Innovators biases, the experiment hence considers a 2x2 full factorial between-subjects 
design. The factors are Innovator setting, viz Complexity Innovator and Resource Innovator (C, R), 
and profit condition, viz high and low (H, L). Notation-wise, Xi, with X Є (C, R), refers to Complexity 
Innovator (C) or Resources Innovator (R), where i Є (H, L) refers to a high-profit (H) or a low-profit 
(L) condition. For example, CH refers to the high-profit Complexity Innovator, whereas RL to the low-
profit Resources Innovator. Thus, the experiment considers four treatments: 
T1: high-profit Complexity Innovator (CH) 
T2: low-profit Complexity Innovator (CL) 
T3: high-profit Resources Innovator (RH) 
T4: low-profit Resources Innovator (RL) 
2.4.3. Experimental procedure 
A total of 55 individuals participated in the experiment. All participants were undergraduate and 
graduate students from management-related disciplines enrolled in US and Swiss universities. The 
16 
experiment was programmed and run with Forio Business Simulations (www.forio.com). Table 2.2 
shows the treatments with their corresponding notation and number of participants. 
 
Table 2.2. Treatments, notation, and number of participants. 
 Profit condition 
 High Low 
Innovator setting 
Complexity 
T1 (CH) 
14 
T2 (CL) 
14 
Resources 
T3 (RH) 
14 
T4 (RL) 
13 
 
Participants arrived and were given the instructions (see Appendix 2.1). Participants had time to 
ask clarifying questions before initiating the experiment. After having read the instructions and 
answered any clarifying questions, an assistant initiated the experiment. Participants made 50 
consecutive decisions for a single project each decision round aiming at maximizing cumulative 
profits. Each decision round began with the participant deciding on the complexity level or resource 
allocation, after which the CT or RT realization and the corresponding realized profits were revealed. 
Information on unit project revenue p and unit development cost c was available in the decision screen 
at any time. Participants had also access to historical information about the outcomes in previous 
projects, including previous decisions, uncertainty factor realizations, profits, and total cumulative 
profits (Appendix 2.2 shows a snapshot of the game screen). Monetary rewards were not used to 
incentivize participants. 
2.5. RESULTS 
2.5.1. Pull-to-center effect 
Before showing the formal hypothesis tests, we first show an overview of the average complexity level 
and resource allocation behaviors. For instance, average complexity level behavior in CH is given by 
averaging average complexity levels across rounds for each participant across the number of 
participants in CH. Figure 2.1 suggests that average complexity level and resource allocation behaviors 
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in the high-profit Innovator settings exhibit the pull-to-center, whereas low-profit Innovator settings 
exhibit a stronger pull-to-center effect. In addition, Figure 2.1 also suggests there are no differences 
between Innovator settings in the same profit condition. Following, we present the formal hypothesis 
tests. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Average complexity level and resource allocation behaviors. 
 
We first formally test whether complexity level and resource allocation behaviors exhibit the pull-
to-center effect in both profit conditions (Hypothesis 1). Table 2.3 shows 95% bootstrap confidence 
intervals around the population of participants’ average decisions for all Innovator settings.1 Table 2.3 
shows that the results of the high-profit Innovator settings are consistent with the pull-to-center effect 
since average complexity level and resource allocation behaviors are contained within the high-profit 
pull-to-center region. Table 2.3 also shows that the results of the low-profit Innovator settings show an 
asymmetric pull-to-center effect since average complexity level and resource allocation behaviors are 
not fully contained within the low-profit pull-to-center region. Such an asymmetry is common in low-
profit conditions (Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al., 2008; Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000). In 
addition, a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test comparing average deviations from the optimum between high- 
and low-profit Innovator settings shows that the effect is in fact stronger in low-profit conditions (W = 
                                                          
1 We report bootstrap confidence intervals since the sample sizes do not guarantee that the samples conform to the 
assumptions needed to report standard confidence intervals. 
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902, z = 2.46, p-value1 tail = 0.0070, r = 0.33).
2
 Hence, we observe average complexity level and 
resource allocation behaviors consistent with the pull-to-center effect in high-profit Innovator settings 
and with an asymmetric pull-to-center effect in low-profit Innovator settings, providing support for 
Hypothesis 1. 
 
Table 2.3. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of average complexity level and resource allocation 
behaviors. 
   SE CI Pull-to-center region 
CH 62.36 3.25 [55.64   68.16] 
[50   75] 
RH 60.40 2.96 [55.35   66.96] 
CL 51.57 3.97 [44.51   59.29] 
[25   50] 
RL 51.35 2.72 [46.66   57.44] 
 
We next test whether complexity level and resource allocation behaviors are similar in the same 
profit condition (Hypothesis 2). We compare populations of participants’ average decisions between 
Innovator settings in the same profit condition. Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests show that we cannot 
statistically rule out the possibility that average complexity level and resource allocation behaviors are 
similar in both high- (W = 190, z = –0.60, p-value2 tails = 0.5503, r = –0.11) and low-profit Innovator 
settings (W = 186, z = 0.19, p-value2 tails = 0.8461, r = 0.04).
3
 Because such similarities are stated as 
null hypotheses, the best we can do is to fail to reject them. These results do not automatically allow 
us to accept the similarities since we could be making a type II error. However, observing the effect 
sizes —denoted as r— provides us with an objective measure of the importance of the effects (Field, 
2009). The effect sizes r = –0.11 and r = 0.04 have a low-to-middle and a low importance in absolute 
                                                          
2 We report a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests since the pooled sample sizes (28 and 27 observations for CH + RH and CL + RL, 
respectively) do not guarantee that the samples conform to the assumptions needed to report an unpaired t-test. However, a 
non-reported unpaired t-test shows qualitatively the same results. 
3 We report Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests since the sample sizes do not guarantee that the samples conform to the assumptions 
needed to report unpaired t-tests. 
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value since they are below the cut-off values 0.30 and 0.10, respectively (Field, 2009). These results 
suggest that complexity level and resource allocation behaviors are similar in the same profit 
condition. Hence, the results are fairly consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
Learning 
Previous Newsvendor experiments have shown mixed evidence regarding learning to avoid the pull-
to-center effect (Benzion et al., 2010; Bolton et al., 2012), yet we also test for it. We compare the 
population of participants’ average deviations from the optimum in the first 10 rounds to that of the 
last 10 rounds within each Innovator setting. Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests show there is significant 
evidence of learning to avoid the pull-to-center effect in CL (W = 167, z = –1.65, p-value1 tail = 0.0491, 
r = –0.31), whereas no evidence in the remaining Innovator settings (CH: W = 195.5, z = –0.34, p-
value1 tail = 0.3652, r = –0.07 — RH: W = 187.5, z = –0.71, p-value1 tail = 0.2382, r = –0.13 — RL: W 
= 162.5, z = –0.67, p-value1 tail = 0.2525, r = –0.13). 
Within each Innovator setting, we also run a fix-effects panel regression model of the form: 
 
|    i  t  1 –   
 |    
 
    
1
t    
2
  eri  t      n eri  t    i    i  t  t   1      (2.5) 
 
where the dependent variable captures participants’ tendency to get closer to the optimal decision 
over time, t refers to round, Overi, t and Underi, t refer to the amount of over- and under-functionality of 
participant i in round t, respectively, and serve as a control for threshold chasing effects, vi is the 
participants’ effect, and  i, t is the error term. Evidence of learning is provided by a significant and 
negative round coefficient. Table 2.4 shows highly significant evidence of learning to avoid the pull-
to-center effect in CL, whereas significant evidence of learning in both RH and RL. 
Taken together, we observe evidence of learning to avoid the pull-to-center effect in CL, whereas 
poor evidence in both RH and RL, which is consistent with the mixed evidence presented in previous 
Newsvendor experiments (Benzion et al., 2010; Bolton et al., 2012). 
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Table 2.4. Fixed-effects panel regression of learning to avoid the pull-to-center effect.
a
 
 CH RH CL RL 
β0 
(Constant) 
22.12
*
 18.92
*
 31.56
*
 36.25
*
 
(1.3483) (1.6753) (1.5253) (1.829) 
β1 
(Round) 
-0.0403 0.1004
†
 -0.1147
*
 0.1101
†
 
(0.0381) (0.0475) (0.0434) (0.0523) 
β2 
(Over) 
0.0340 -0.0394 0.0487 0.0608
‡
 
(0.0244) (0.0301) (0.0328) (0.0335) 
β3 
(Under) 
-0.0902
†
 0.2103
*
 -0.0313 -0.1727
*
 
(0.0382) (0.0397) (0.0346) (0.0432) 
R
2 0.2459 0.1971 0.4042 0.2376 
F 4.99 17.30 4.43 12.55 
p-value 0.0020 0.0000 0.0043 0.0000 
a Standard errors in parentheses. 
* Highly significant, † Significant, ‡ Marginally significant. 
 
2.5.2. Threshold chasing bias 
Before showing the formal hypothesis test, we first show an overview of the average adjustment 
behavior period-to-period. For instance, average adjustment behavior towards prior functionality 
thresholds in CH is given by averaging the number of complexity level adjustments towards the prior 
functionality threshold for each participant across the number of participants in CH. Regardless of the 
profit condition, Figure 2.2 suggests that when participants did change decisions period-to-period, they 
did it more frequently towards than away from prior functionality thresholds and number of tasks that 
need to be completed before launch in the Complexity and Resource Innovators, respectively. 
Following, we present the formal hypothesis test. 
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Figure 2.2. Average complexity level and resource allocation adjustment behaviors period-to-period. 
 
We now test whether complexity level and resource allocation adjustment behaviors period-to-
period are consistent with the threshold chasing bias in both profit conditions (Hypothesis 3). We 
compare the population of participants’ number of adjustments towards prior threshold realizations to 
that of adjustments away from them within each Innovator setting. Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests in Table 
2.5 show that the average number of adjustments towards prior threshold realizations is significantly 
larger than the average number of adjustments away from them in all Innovator settings, providing 
support for Hypothesis 3.
 4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 We report Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests since the sample sizes do not guarantee that the samples conform to the assumptions 
needed to report unpaired t-tests. 
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Table 2.5. Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests of threshold chasing bias. 
   W z p-value1 tail r Support 
  
   27.5 
117.5 -3.93 0.0000 -0.74
 
High 
  
   9.3 
R 
   26.3 
144 -2.71 0.0034 -0.51
 
High
 
R 
   18.8 
  
   27.3 
123.5 -3.65 0.0001 -0.69
 
High
 
  
   12.6 
R 
   25.4 
129.5 -2.36 0.0092 -0.46
 
High
 
R 
   14.2 
 
Learning 
Newsvendor experiments have tested learning to avoid the threshold chasing bias to a lesser extent 
than learning to avoid the pull-to-center effect. Nevertheless, previous Newsvendor experiments 
suggest that individuals show a tendency to avoid the threshold chasing bias over time (Benzion et al., 
2008; Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000). Accordingly, we compare the population of participants’ 
number of adjustments towards prior threshold realizations in the first 10 rounds to that of the last 10 
rounds within each Innovator setting. Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests show there is significant evidence of 
learning to avoid the threshold chasing bias in both CH and CL (CH: W = 162.5, z = –1.86, p-value1 tail 
= 0.0314, r = –0.35 — CL: W = 160.5, z = –1.95, p-value1 tail = 0.0254, r = –0.37), marginal evidence 
in RH (W = 174.5, z = –1.31, p-value1 tail = 0.0952, r = –0.25), and no evidence in RL (W = 165, z = –
0.54, p-value1 tail = 0.2951, r = –0.11). 
However, a decline in the number of adjustments towards prior threshold realizations does not 
necessarily capture a decline in the magnitude of decision adjustments period-to-period. Within each 
Innovator setting, we hence run a fix-effects panel regression model in which the only difference with 
respect to (2.5) is the dependent variable |    i  t  1 –     i  t|, which captures participants’ tendency to 
reduce the absolute change in complexity levels between two consecutive rounds over time. Table 2.6 
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shows significant evidence of a decline in the magnitude of decision adjustments period-to-period in 
CL only. 
Whereas the number of adjustments towards prior threshold realizations tends to decline over time, 
the magnitude of the adjustments does not. Taken together, we observe poor evidence of learning to 
avoid the threshold chasing bias. 
 
Table 2.6. Fixed-effects panel regression of learning to avoid the threshold chasing bias.
a
 
 CH RH CL RL 
β0 
(Constant) 
11.31
*
 13.63
*
 9.41
*
 13.77
*
 
(1.4634) (1.7870) (1.3876) (1.8270) 
β1 
(Round) 
-0.0557 0.0184 -0.0837
†
 0.0006 
(0.0414) (0.0507) (0.0395) (0.0522) 
β2 
(Over) 
0.1379
*
 0.0008 0.1890
*
 0.0160 
(0.0265) (0.0321) (0.0299) (0.0334) 
β3 
(Under) 
0.2920
*
 0.0767
‡
 0.1404
*
 0.0793
‡
 
(0.0414) (0.0423) (0.0315) (0.0431) 
R
2 0.2758 0.1448 0.1872 0.1549 
F 18.41 1.45 15.97 1.19 
p-value 0.0000 0.2274 0.0000 0.3129 
a Standard errors in parentheses. 
* Highly significant, † Significant, ‡ Marginally significant. 
 
2.6. DISCUSSION 
We proposed a stylized analytical model to inform NPD decision making under innovation 
uncertainty. Assuming a single stage-gate innovation pipeline under a single uncertainty source, the 
proposed Innovator model draws a close parallel with the Newsvendor model, a traditional Operations 
Management model for ordering inventory under stochastic demand. The study shows how decisions 
in our stylized Innovator model are analytically equivalent to decisions in the traditional Newsvendor 
model. The analogy allows applying insights from the Newsvendor model to NPD decision making 
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under innovation uncertainty. Hence, our research seeks to inform decision making under uncertainty 
in NPD settings. 
By the same token, our research also suggests that NPD managers may be prone to the same 
decision making biases commonly observed in Newsvendor settings. Operationalizing the Innovator 
model under complexity and resource uncertainty separately, a lab experiment showed that decision 
making biases in NPD settings resemble those observed in Newsvendor experiments. In particular, we 
observed a pull-to-center effect. That is, for high-profit projects, individuals under react when 
innovation costs and uncertainty require more ambitious scopes or resources. In contrast, for low-
profit projects, they overreact when innovation costs and uncertainty require less ambitious scopes or 
resources. In addition, the effect is stronger in low-profit projects. That is, the overreaction is stronger 
than the under reaction. 
Under the proposed operationalizations of the Innovator model, high-profit Innovator settings 
require setting high complexity levels (ambitious design goals) or allocating a large amount of 
resources (stretched resource allocations) in order to launch a successful product to the market place. 
In contrast, low-profit Innovator settings require setting low complexity levels or allocating a small 
amount or resources in order to launch a successful product to the market place. Pull-to-center effect 
results then suggest that NPD managers may underperform in demanding markets (high-profit 
Innovator settings), limiting their a priori likelihood of success, and over perform in less challenging 
markets (low-profit Innovator settings), a priory investing more effort than that required for success. In 
addition, the asymmetric pull-to-center effect in low-profit Innovator settings suggests that less 
challenging markets may pose more survival threats to NPD managers and their organizations. 
Moreover, we observed no differences between Complexity and Resource Innovators in the same 
profit condition, suggesting that a poor understanding of the structure of the problem rather than a 
specific uncertainty type drives poor managerial decision making behavior under innovation 
uncertainty. That is, individuals seem to fail to find a balance between over and under development 
costs under innovation uncertainty in general. These results may hold also for NPD managers since 
purchasing managers exhibit a similar behavior in the analogous Newsvendor model (Bolton et al., 
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2012). In addition, we also observed a threshold chasing bias. That is, individuals tend to chase 
uncertainty thresholds realized in previous innovation efforts. These results suggest that NPD 
managers may be affected by a recency bias that makes individuals to place a higher weight on recent 
events to the detriment of an understanding of the structure of the task at hand. Taken together, these 
results suggest that NPD managers may poorly understand decision making under innovation 
uncertainty and the influence of threshold cues may prevent them from engaging in understanding it in 
the first place. The mixed results regarding learning to avoid both the pull-to-center effect and the 
threshold chasing bias further reinforce the previous point. 
Although Newsvendor research has shown that in some cases individuals recognize the structure of 
the problem, it has also shown that they may still fail to convert such information into good 
Newsvendor decision making (Cui et al., 2013; Gavirneni and Isen, 2010). However, Bolton et al. 
(2012) showed that Newsvendor task training helps individuals convert such information into 
improved Newsvendor decision making. Hence, this suggests that training NPD managers in the 
Innovator model may help them mitigate biased behavior. 
Overall, our research suggests that the Innovator model can be used as a building block to study 
NPD decision making under innovation uncertainty, bringing special attention to the study of 
managerial biases in NPD settings. However, we also acknowledge the novelty of the application of 
the Innovator model and the challenges that it imposes. For instance, we proposed a stylized analytical 
model by assuming a single stage-gate innovation pipeline under a single uncertainty source. These 
simplifying assumptions bring attention to external validity concerns typical of most experimental 
studies. Hence, future work could expand the Innovator model by incorporating more than one 
development stage, several uncertainty sources simultaneously, or relax both assumptions in a 
systematic manner to study the effect of increasing complexity levels of the innovation setting on 
decision making. 
Also, managers in real situations may not decide as did our sample of both undergraduate and 
graduate students from management-related disciplines. Although there is not systematic evidence 
indicating that managers perform better than students in Newsvendor settings (Bolton et al., 2012), it 
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may be the case that NPD settings impose additional challenges to those typical of Newsvendor 
settings (e.g., potentially riskier environments), and thus managers may decide differently in an 
Innovator setting. Hence, future work could test the Innovator model with a sample of managers. In 
addition, monetary rewards were not used to incentivize participants. On the one hand, it could be 
argued that monetary rewards would improve results. On the other hand, the fact that behavior was 
fairly consistent with behavior observed in previous Newsvendor experiments may cast doubt on this 
observation. Nevertheless, future research could use monetary rewards for the sake of experimental 
rigor and analyze whether the use of incentives makes a significant difference. 
Similarly, other contextual factors potentially important in NPD settings such as incentive systems 
and group decision process were not taken into consideration to avoid introducing confounding factors 
into the analysis and run a clean test of the Innovator model. Future work could explore how these and 
other contextual factors s influence Innovators’ behavior. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, endeavors like this make the tradeoff inherent to experiments, 
i.e., the advantages of experiments for controlling confounding factors and establishing cause-and-
effect relationships vs. the lack of external validity, both necessary and acceptable. The Innovator 
model is a first step to formally explore how NPD managers make decisions under different types of 
innovation uncertainty. We believe there are significant research opportunities ahead along this same 
line. 
 
Appendix 2.1. Sample of written instructions (CH) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions in product development (PD) 
efforts. 
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DESCRIPTION OF THE GAME 
You are a senior PD manager deciding the complexity level of the projects that your company will 
launch. Your complexity decisions (e.g., the functionality of a software program) influence the 
likelihood that a project may pass (or not) the threshold established in the screening process set by the 
company’s vice president (VP). 
 
For each project, your complexity decision must be made before you know for certain what the VP’s 
screen level is. Based on past projects, however, you know that the screen is uniformly distributed 
between 1% and 100%. That is, the screen level is equally likely to take any value from 1% to 100%. 
Moreover, projects are independent of each other. That is, complexity decisions made in one project 
do not carry over and do not affect other projects. 
 
Projects that are launched generate on average more profits than projects that fail. Profits for projects 
that are launched are proportional to the screen level (the VP’s assessed market potential). Profits for 
projects that fail are proportional to the complexity level (the amount of work the company has 
devoted to the project). The reward for a project launched is 12 francs for each screen unit. The cost 
for a project is 3 francs for each complexity unit. 
 
GOAL 
Your goal is to maximize the profits you make over 50 projects (rounds of decisions). 
 
PLAYING THE GAME 
To access the game, follow the link [game link]. 
 
DECISIONS 
Please write down your Complexity level decisions in the table provided. 
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[Decision table] 
 
After completing all your decisions, send the electronic data by email by following the next steps: 
 
- Right click on the table with your decisions (the table on the upper right of the screen) 
- Select Copy Data and Paste it in an e-mail 
- Copy and Paste the link of the simulation (web address that appears in your Internet browser) 
- Send the e-mail to: [e-mail address] 
 
Appendix 2.2. Sample of game screen (CH) 
 
 
Figure A2.2.1. Sample of game screen. 
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CHAPTER 3 
IMPACT OF JOINT DECISIONS AND COGNITIVE 
DISSONANCE ON PREPOSITIONING (NEWSVENDOR) 
DECISIONS 
(with Paulo Gonçalves) 
 
ABSTRACT 
Prepositioning of emergency supplies is a critical task for the success of humanitarian relief 
operations. However, little is known about how humanitarian practitioners actually make 
prepositioning decisions. In a laboratory (lab) experiment based on the Newsvendor model, 
humanitarian practitioners prepositioned emergency supplies of different importance. When making 
single item decisions, practitioners’ prepositioning behavior shows the pull-to-center effect observed 
in traditional Newsvendor experiments. When making decisions for two items of different importance, 
practitioners either increase or reduce the pull-to-center effect. In particular, practitioners made joint 
prepositioning decisions in either a cognitive dissonant treatment, where a high-importance item in a 
low-safety stock condition was joined with a low-importance item in a high-safety stock condition; or 
a cognitive consonant treatment, where a high-importance item in a high-safety stock condition was 
joined with a low-importance item in a low-safety stock condition. Results show that the importance 
of emergency items in joint decisions influences prepositioning behavior, with dissonant 
prepositioning decisions increasing the pull-to-center effect for high-importance items, and consonant 
prepositioning decisions reducing the pull-to-center effect for high-importance items. Neither 
dissonance nor consonance influence prepositioning behavior for low-importance items. Our research 
suggests that cognitive dissonance can influence joint prepositioning decisions in Newsvendor 
settings. 
30 
Keywords: Behavioral Operations Management, Cognitive Dissonance, Debiasing, Inventory 
Prepositioning, Laboratory Experiments, Newsvendor Model, Pull-to-Center Effect. 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Events triggering humanitarian action such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and acts of terrorism can strike 
communities with little warning and leave devastation, homeless people and casualties behind. As 
expressed by the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative in their meeting held in Stockholm in 2003, 
“the objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity 
during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters.” In order to achieve these goals, 
humanitarian organizations (HOs) provide shelter and assistance to victims of disasters as soon as 
possible. Under these circumstances, prepositioning of supplies becomes critical because supplies 
necessary to provide shelter and assistance are readily available when needed (Rawls and Turnquist, 
2010). 
Prepositioning supplies is not an easy task, however. One of the main difficulties for prepositioning 
activities is uncertainty about whether or not humanitarian emergencies will occur, and if they do, 
where and with what magnitude (Rawls and Turnquist, 2010). Examples illustrating these challenges 
are common. For instance, several manufacturing and retail firms experienced stock-outs in 2004 
because they were not prepared to meet the demand caused by the multiple hurricanes that struck 
southeastern United States. In 2005, these firms again experienced stock-outs because of the extreme 
demand surge caused by Hurricane Katrina. These experiences motivated firms to be more aggressive 
in their approach to stocking supplies the following year. However, because of an inactive hurricane 
season in 2006, excess inventory was commonplace among firms (Taskin and Lodree Jr., 2010). 
The inventory control literature is extensive; however, no much work has been done to directly 
address prepositioning plans for emergency supplies. For instance, based on a case study of a single 
HO operating a warehouse in Kenya and responding to the south Sudan crisis, Beamon and Kotleba 
(2006) developed a stochastic inventory control model that determines optimal order quantities and 
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reorder points for a long-term emergency relief response. Using the Newsvendor model as starting 
point, Lodree Jr. and Taskin (2008) introduced two variants to account for the uncertainties about (i) 
the occurrence of an extreme event and (ii) the demand for supplies, equipment, and manpower, 
comparing the solution of the modified model to the classic one. The difference was interpreted as an 
insurance premium associated with proactive disaster relief planning, establishing an insurance policy 
framework that managers can easily relate to in terms of quantifying the risks and benefits associated 
with stocking decisions related to preparing for disaster relief responses. Going beyond prepositioning 
activities, Balcik and Beamon (2008) integrated facility location and inventory ordering decisions in a 
variant of the maximal covering location model, considering also multiple item types, budgetary 
constraints, and capacity restrictions to determine the number and location of distribution centers in a 
relief network, and the amount of relief supplies to be stocked at each center. 
The studies above are normative in nature, i.e., they provide an optimal solution given certain 
assumptions of the prepositioning task. To our knowledge, no previous work has directly assessed how 
people actually make inventory prepositioning decisions for emergency supplies. However, typical lab 
experiments on profit-based Newsvendor settings are insightful as to how individuals make inventory 
ordering decisions. They have shown that, on average, individuals’ inventory ordering decisions are 
lower than the optimum when a high-safety stock is required; and they are higher than the optimum 
when a low-safety stock is required. This systematic Newsvendor result is known as the pull-to-center 
effect or the average tendency of individuals to order between the normative solution and the mean 
demand (Bostian et al., 2008). 
The pull-to-center effect has been replicated in several experiments since it was first documented 
by Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) (e.g., Benzion et al., 2008, 2010; Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian 
et al., 2008). Given the prevalence of this biased inventory ordering behavior, subsequent lab 
experiments have tested different mechanisms aimed at helping individuals to overcome it. The focus 
has been mainly on devising mechanisms to address the flat-maximum problem (or the flatness of the 
Newsvendor’s expected profit function around the optimum) and its impediments for learning. For 
instance, some work has addressed the flat-maximum problem by sharpening payoff differentials (e.g., 
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Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al., 2008), whereas others have addressed it by modifying the 
frequency of decisions and feedback (e.g., Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al., 2008; Lurie and 
Swaminathan, 2009). Results are not conclusive since they have shown no systematic positive effect 
by sharpening payoff differentials and mixed results by modifying the frequency of decisions and 
feedback. 
In this paper, we run a Newsvendor experiment in which individuals make inventory prepositioning 
decisions for emergency supplies and test a debiasing mechanism that departs from previously 
attempted debiasing efforts. In particular, we test the effectiveness of a joint decision framework that 
builds on cognitive dissonance theory as a possible debiasing mechanism for the pull-to-center effect. 
In the proposed joint decision framework, individuals make simultaneous inventory prepositioning 
decisions for two items of different importance (high and low) each in one of two safety stock 
conditions (high and low). In our framework, item importance relates to its relevance to achieve the 
objectives of humanitarian action (e.g., save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity), 
i.e., it is not safety stock related, whereas safety stock conditions refer to inventory levels that ensure 
that necessary supplies can be available as soon as possible at minimum cost. 
Our experiment attempts to elicit a state of consonance or dissonance on individuals and explore 
how such states affect individuals’ inventory prepositioning decisions. We elicit a state of dissonance 
by asking individuals to simultaneously preposition a high-importance item in a low-safety stock 
condition and a low-importance item in a high-safety stock condition. Analogously, we elicit a state of 
consonance by asking individuals to simultaneously preposition a high-importance item in a high-
safety stock condition and a low-importance item in a low-safety stock condition. Finally, we explore 
how the different states impact inventory prepositioning decisions by comparing such decisions to 
those of a control in single inventory prepositioning decision treatments. Our results show that 
dissonant and consonant states impact inventory prepositioning decisions for high-importance items in 
Newsvendor settings, with dissonant states increasing the pull-to-center effect, and consonant states 
reducing it. Dissonant and consonant states do not seem to affect the decisions for low-importance 
items. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 frames prepositioning of emergency 
supplies as a Newsvendor problem, explores the pull-to-center effect literature, describes the joint 
decision framework, and develops hypotheses. Section 3.3 presents the lab design, treatments and 
experimental procedure. Section 3.4 presents the main results and hypothesis tests. Finally, section 3.5 
summarizes the work, discusses the main findings, limitations, and opportunities for future research. 
3.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.2.1. Prepositioning of emergency supplies as a Newsvendor problem 
Several HOs preposition a number of emergency supplies or items (e.g., water, blankets, and vaccines) 
in preparation to humanitarian relief operations. Maintaining an adequate amount of prepositioned 
emergency items can have a significant impact on the success of humanitarian relief operations. 
However, HOs must make prepositioning decisions without knowledge of beneficiary demand, since 
demand only materializes after a disaster strikes. In addition, a cost-effective use of funds is also an 
objective pursued by HOs given donors’ pressure for effectiveness, transparency, and accountability 
(Thomas, 2003; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005; van der Laan et al., 2009). By having uncertainty in 
beneficiary demand and cost-effectiveness metrics, the Newsvendor model (Arrow et al., 1951) can 
inform inventory prepositioning decisions. 
In an inventory prepositioning task, q prepositioned items are purchased at unit cost w. After a 
disaster strikes, beneficiary demand D is realized. If q exceeds D, then no items are expedited. 
However, each excess item q – D incurs a disposal cost s. If, instead, D exceeds prepositioned amount 
q, then additional items D – q must be expedited to meet beneficiary demand at an additional unit cost 
x. That is, unit overage cost co equals w + s and unit underage cost cu equals x. For simplicity, and 
following previous Newsvendor experiments, we assume no disposal cost when the amount 
prepositioned q exceeds demand D, i.e., co = w, and certainty in sales season (or emergency) 
occurrence (cf. Lodree Jr. and Taskin, 2008). If D is a random variable with cdf F, it is well-known 
that the optimal prepositioning quantity Q
*
 is characterized by the critical fractile F(Q
*
) = cu / (cu + 
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co). Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) define a product as a high-profit (or high-safety stock) product 
when F(Q
*) ≥ 1/2 and as a low-profit (or low-safety stock) product otherwise.5 
3.2.2. Newsvendor’s pull-to-center effect 
Newsvendor experiments have consistently shown that individuals make biased inventory ordering 
decisions. In their seminal experimental study of the Newsvendor model, Schweitzer and Cachon 
(2000) showed that individuals’ inventory ordering decisions are lower than the optimum in a high-
safety stock condition, and higher than the optimum in a low-safety stock condition, i.e., individuals 
tend to order too few high-profit items and too many low-profit ones. This result is known as the pull-
to-center effect (Bostian et al., 2008).
6
 
The pull-to-center effect has been replicated in several experiments since it was first documented 
by Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) (e.g., Benzion et al., 2008, 2010; Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian 
et al., 2008). Given the prevalence of this biased inventory ordering behavior and its incongruity with 
expected profit maximization, subsequent experimental research has proposed different mechanisms 
aimed at helping individuals to overcome it. 
According to Bolton and Katok (2008), biased ordering behavior is consistent with the facts that 
“people are adaptive” and “have limited information processing capacity” (p. 521). In an attempt to 
overcome the bias, they experimentally tested modifications to experience and feedback “known to 
improve adaption or information processing” (p. 521). First, they provided individuals with extended 
experience by allowing them to make inventory ordering decisions during 100 rounds. Second, they 
sharpened payoff differentials by reducing the number of ordering options to potentially mitigate 
impediments to learning stemming from the flatness of the expected profit function around the 
maximum. Finally, they presented individuals with improved outcome feedback by providing them 
                                                          
5 The prepositioning task does not include any cost metric related to revenue, making thus the operational setting entirely 
cost-based yet structurally the same as profit-based settings as shown by F(Q*). 
6 We emphasize the use of the expression pull-to-center effect over anchoring and insufficient adjustment bias (Schweitzer 
and Cachon, 2000) since the former does not make strong assumptions about what actually drives inventory ordering 
behavior, which remains an open question in Behavioral Operations Management research. 
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with payoffs of forgone options and by reducing decision frequency, imposing individuals to maintain 
the same order for 10 rounds. 
A number of researchers have also provided individuals with extended experience by allowing 
them to make inventory ordering decisions for multiple rounds. Bostian et al. (2008) provided 
individuals with 30 decision rounds, whereas Bolton et al. (2012) and Benzion et al. (2008, 2010) 
provided individuals with 100 decision rounds. Others have also attempted to address the impediments 
to learning stemming from the flatness of the expected profit function around the maximum. Bostian et 
al. (2008) sharpened payoff differentials by making the economic consequences of under and over 
stocking twice as severe. They also presented individuals with improved outcome feedback by 
reducing decision frequency to once every 5 rounds. In a further manipulation, in addition to reducing 
decision frequency, outcome feedback itself was also shortened to once every 5 rounds. Analogously, 
Lurie and Swaminathan (2009) proposed a more systematic manipulation of decision frequency and 
outcome feedback frequency. They decoupled feedback frequency from decision frequency by fixing 
decision frequency and varying outcome feedback frequency in order to separate their effects. 
Results from this line of research are inconclusive, since studies show mixed results. Some studies 
show improvements with trends in direction to optimal inventory ordering quantities (Benzion et al., 
2008; Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al., 2008); others, however, show no improvement trends 
(Benzion et al., 2010; Bolton et al., 2012). Research results have shown no systematic positive effect 
of sharpening payoff differentials (Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al., 2008), and mixed results by 
modifying the frequency of decisions and outcome feedback. For instance, Bolton and Katok (2008) 
find that reducing decision frequency matters; however, Bostian et al. (2008) and Lurie and 
Swaminathan (2009) find the opposite. Similarly, Lurie and Swaminathan (2009) find that reducing 
outcome feedback frequency matters; however, Bostian et al. (2008) find the contrary. Finally, Lurie 
and Swaminathan’s (2009) research suggests that outcome feedback frequency may be more important 
than decision frequency. 
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This study departs from the previously described debiasing efforts by testing a novel joint decision 
framework that builds on cognitive dissonance theory as a potential debiasing mechanism for the pull-
to-center effect. The framework and the corresponding hypotheses are described next. 
3.2.3. Joint decision making as a debiasing mechanism 
As the description above suggests, the pull-to-center effect is a robust finding in Newsvendor 
experiments. Still, while a number of experimental studies propose debiasing mechanisms in an 
attempt to move individuals’ decisions closer to the optimum, the proposed mechanisms do not always 
work consistently across settings. This research proposes a debiasing mechanism that joins or bundles 
Newsvendor inventory ordering decisions for two items of different importance and different safety 
stock conditions. By joint decisions, we mean two simultaneous decisions (e.g., order quantity for two 
different items). Previous experimental studies on joint decisions have mainly considered choice 
partitioning (choice bracketing, outcome editing, and joint vs. separate evaluation of alternatives), 
which considers a joint evaluation of two mutually exclusive options (e.g., order either item A or item 
B). Hence, in such settings a person must choose a single option (e.g., ordering item A automatically 
rejects the alternative) (see Milkman et al. (2008) and Read et al. (1999) for reviews). The proposed 
joint decision framework is conceptually different from choice partitioning since people must make 
two decisions at the same time (e.g., order quantities for both item A and item B). Although the 
Newsstand model literature has studied simultaneous or multi-item Newsvendor decisions (e.g., 
Abdel-Malek and Montanari, 2005; Lau and Lau, 1995, 1996), the literature is normative in nature. 
Hence, little is known about how people actually make simultaneous inventory ordering decisions.
7
 
By bundling decisions of high-importance items with low-importance ones in a Newsvendor 
experiment, we expect individuals to place large orders for high-importance items and small orders for 
low-importance items. Also, by pairing item importance and safety stock levels, we hope to further 
                                                          
7 An exception is Tong and Song’s (2011) study of the effect of transaction utility (Thaler, 1980, 1985) on Newsvendor 
ordering decisions. However, their transaction utility framework is conceptually different from the proposed cognitive 
dissonant framework since they exploit safety stock condition comparisons, whereas we exploit both importance and safety 
stock condition comparisons, not to mention differences in transaction utility and cognitive dissonance arguments. 
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manipulate the traditional pull-to-center effect. In particular, we expect to mitigate biased inventory 
ordering behavior when we bundle orders for a high-importance item in a high-safety stock condition 
with those for a low-importance item in a low-safety stock condition. In contrast, we expect to 
intensify it when we bundle orders for a high-importance item in a low-safety stock condition with 
those for a low-importance item in a high-safety stock condition. 
Baseline hypothesis 
Our baseline hypotheses test the behavior of individuals when making separate inventory ordering 
decisions about items of difference importance. While we expect orders for items of different 
importance to change when those decisions are bundled (as we explain below), a priori we have no 
reason to expect them to change when those decisions are made separately. It is possible that 
individuals’ separate decisions result in larger orders for a high-importance item in a high-safety stock 
condition than a low-importance item in the same condition. However, given the lack of a reference 
allowing individuals to compare their decisions in separate decision treatments, we do not expect 
decisions to be influenced by item importance. Therefore, we expect inventory prepositioning 
decisions in the same safety stock condition to be similar regardless of the importance of the item. 
Hence: 
HYPOTHESIS 1A:  In a separate decision treatment, the quantity of high-importance items 
prepositioned will be similar to the quantity of low-importance items 
prepositioned in a low-safety stock condition. 
HYPOTHESIS 1B:  In a separate decision treatment, the quantity of high-importance items 
prepositioned will be similar to the quantity of low-importance items 
prepositioned in a high-safety stock condition. 
In other words, Hypothesis 1 tests that a potential alignment or misalignment among an item’s 
importance and its safety stock condition by itself does not affect typical Newsvendor inventory 
ordering behavior. Decisions in the separate decision treatments serve thus as a baseline or controls for 
the joint decision treatments. 
38 
Cognitive dissonant hypothesis 
Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory provides the underlying motivation for the proposed 
debiasing/bias-strengthening mechanism in the joint decision treatments. For Festinger (1957), 
individuals hold a multitude of cognitions, or bits of knowledge, simultaneously about different 
attributes (e.g., attitudes, emotions, and behaviors). Most of these cognitions have no relationship to 
each other and are said to be irrelevant. Some cognitions, however, are related to one another. Two 
related cognitions are said to be consonant if one cognition follows from, or fits with, the other. On the 
other hand, two cognitions are said to be dissonant if one cognition follows from the opposite of 
another. Instrumentally, Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory holds that individuals do not 
like to be in a state of dissonance, and are motivated to act to reduce the inconsistency. Actions that 
reduce dissonance can take place in three ways: (i) by changing one of the dissonant cognitions, with 
the action typically supporting the cognition most resistant to change; by (ii) adding consonant 
cognitions and/or subtracting dissonant cognitions to reduce the overall level of inconsistency; and by 
(iii) reaffirming, or increasing, the importance of consonant cognitions, or trivializing, or decreasing, 
the importance of dissonant cognitions (Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones, 2007; Simon et al., 1995). 
In our Newsvendor setting, a cognitive dissonant joint decision treatment has individuals placing 
orders both for a high-importance item in a low-safety stock condition and for a low-importance item 
in a high-safety stock condition. By bundling two decisions (cognitions) about two items of different 
importance, we remove by design dissonance reduction mechanisms (i) and (ii). Specifically, the 
importance and safety stock conditions of the items are fixed, and there are only two types of 
decisions, with no other cognitions added or subtracted. Hence, individuals in our experiment can only 
address the inherent dissonance by (iii) decreasing the importance of dissonant cognitions (Simon et 
al., 1995). 
Building on these arguments, we expect individuals in a cognitive dissonant joint decision 
treatment will reduce the importance of dissonant cognitions by placing large orders of the high-
importance low-safety stock item and small orders of the low-importance high-safety stock item. 
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Moreover, a trivialization is often achieved by making an important cognition salient, directing 
attention towards it to the detriment of other cognitions (Simon et al., 1995). In our experiment, the 
high-importance item is inherently more salient than the low-importance item, suggesting that 
individuals may direct attention toward inventory ordering decisions for the high-importance item to 
the detriment of those decisions for the low-importance one. 
Taken together, we hypothesize that in a cognitive dissonant joint decision treatment individuals 
will trivialize orders of the high-importance low-safety stock item by ordering larger amounts relative 
to the corresponding low-safety stock baseline. Such result would strengthen the pull-to-center effect. 
In addition, trivialization suggests that individuals may place orders for the low-importance high-
safety stock item that are smaller than the corresponding high-safety stock baseline. However, given 
the salience of the high-importance item, we hypothesize that individuals will not direct attention to 
decisions of the low-importance item, ordering a similar amount of the low-importance item than the 
baseline amount. Hence: 
HYPOTHESIS 2A: In a cognitive dissonant joint decision treatment, the quantity of high-
importance items prepositioned will be larger than the quantity of high-
importance items prepositioned in a separate decision treatment in a low-
safety stock condition. 
HYPOTHESIS 2B: In a cognitive dissonant joint decision treatment, the quantity of low-
importance items prepositioned will be similar to the quantity of low-
importance items prepositioned in a separate decision treatment in a high-
safety stock condition. 
Since we cannot infer the magnitude of the dissonance effect, it is not possible to estimate how far 
orders for the high-importance item may be from the optimum. Hence, it is possible that orders may 
overshoot the mean in a low-safety stock condition, strengthening even further the pull-to-center 
effect. 
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Cognitive consonant hypothesis 
While Festinger (1957) did not specifically theorize about consonance effects and the way individuals 
react to them, he asserted that consonant cognitions reaffirm each other (Harmon-Jones and Harmon-
Jones, 2007; Simon et al., 1995). Hence, we explore such reaffirmation and extend Festinger’s (1957) 
and Simon et al.’s (1995) dissonance arguments to consonance. In our Newsvendor setting, a 
cognitive consonant joint decision treatment has individuals placing orders both for a high-
importance item in a high-safety stock condition and for a low-importance item in a low-safety stock 
condition. 
We conjecture that individuals in a cognitive consonant joint decision treatment will reaffirm the 
importance of consonant cognitions by placing large orders for the high-importance high-safety stock 
item. Hence, we first hypothesize that individuals will preposition a larger amount of the high-
importance high-safety stock item relative to the corresponding high-safety stock baseline, potentially 
lessening the pull-to-center effect. Moreover, extending Simon et al.’s (1995) arguments on the 
salience of the high-importance item to the detriment of the low-importance one, we further 
hypothesize that individuals will preposition a similar amount of the low-importance item relative to 
the corresponding low-safety stock baseline. Hence: 
HYPOTHESIS 3A: In a cognitive consonant joint decision treatment, the quantity of high-
importance items prepositioned will be larger than the quantity of high-
importance items prepositioned in a separate decision treatment in a high-
safety stock condition. 
HYPOTHESIS 3B: In a cognitive consonant joint decision treatment, the quantity of low-
importance items prepositioned will be similar to the quantity of low-
importance items prepositioned in a separate decision treatment in a low-
safety stock condition. 
Similarly, we cannot infer the magnitude of the consonance effect. It is possible that consonance 
may result in orders that overshoot the optimum. 
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In summary, our experiments treat decisions as cognitions and bundles consonant and dissonant 
decisions to explore their impact on Newsvendor inventory ordering behavior. Our hypotheses on 
cognitive dissonance build on Festinger’s (1957) work, where those on dissonance reduction actions 
build on Simon et al. (1995). Our hypotheses on cognitive consonance parallel the arguments and 
theory available to cognitive dissonance. We conjecture that dissonant decisions may intensify the 
pull-to-center effect, whereas consonant decisions may mitigate it. The next section presents the lab 
experiment and the proposed treatments. 
3.3. LABORATORY EXPERIMENT 
3.3.1. Basic design 
Typical Newsvendor experiments fix selling price p and manipulate purchasing cost w in order to 
create two basic treatments: one for high-profit products and another for low-profit products. Given 
our emphasis on cost, we fix the expediting cost at x = 3 and manipulate prepositioning cost w, setting 
it up at w = 1, implying a critical fractile of 3/4 (high-safety stock items), and w = 9, implying a 
critical fractile of 1/4 (low-safety stock items). While the experimental design guarantees that any 
unmet demand resulting from insufficient inventory prepositioning is eventually met through 
expediting, meeting demand takes place with a delay and at additional cost. Hence, one cannot simply 
assume that the dissonance associated with insufficient inventory prepositioning can be dismissed. 
We consider an uniformly distributed beneficiary demand D~U(0, 100) with mean quantity = 50 
and integer values for both high- and low-safety stock items in all treatments, consistent with related 
literature (e.g., Bolton and Katok, 2008; Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000). Besides capturing uncertainty 
in beneficiary demand, a demand distribution also captures the implicit assumption that HOs will set 
the boundaries of uncertainty based on information about past emergencies. In each treatment, we use 
a different noise seed to ensure different realizations of demand in each period. During the 
instructions, we inform participants about the different realizations of demand. Results of previous 
Newsvendor experiments suggest the use of different noise seeds to avoid confusion since individuals 
tend to chase demand (e.g., Benzion et al., 2008; Bolton and Katok, 2008; Kremer et al., 2010). 
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The described parameterization implies an optimal inventory prepositioning quantity in the high-
safety stock condition of 75 ( 
 
     5) and an optimal inventory prepositioning quantity in the low-
safety stock condition of 25 ( 
 
    25). 
3.3.2. Notation 
Let Xi
 
, with X Є (   N), denote the number of critical-to-life (C) items (high-importance items), or 
nice-to-have (N) items (low-importance items); where i Є (    ) refers to a high-safety stock (H) or a 
low-safety stock (L) condition; and j Є (S, J) refers to a separate (S) or a joint decision (J) treatment. 
For instance,   
  refers to the number of critical-to-life items prepositioned in a separate decision 
treatment in a low-safety stock condition, whereas N 
  refers to the number of nice-to-have items 
prepositioned in a joint decision treatment in a high-safety stock condition.
8
 
3.3.3. Treatments 
To explore the impact of dissonance theory on inventory prepositioning decisions, we create a 2x2 full 
factorial design. The factors are cognitive state, viz dissonant and consonant, and type of decision, viz 
separate and joint, i.e., there are two levels for each factor. The cognitive dissonant separate decision 
treatment corresponds to (i) a critical-to-life low-safety stock item and (ii) a nice-to-have high-safety 
stock item, which are run independently. The cognitive consonant separate decision treatment 
corresponds to (iii) a critical-to-life high-safety stock item and (iv) a nice-to-have low-safety stock 
item, which are also run independently. For clarity of exposition, the separate (or baseline) decision 
treatments are shown separately. Hence, we have 4 baseline treatments:  
T1: critical-to-life low-safety stock items (  
 ), 
T2: nice-to-have high-safety stock items (N 
 ), 
T3: critical-to-life high-safety stock items (  
 ), and 
                                                          
8 Besides using generic names for the items, the context of the experiment is in general abstract (e.g., there is no mention to 
any emergency type or region). That way, we motivate items’ importance only through the framing of the experiment and not 
through other factors such as participants’ experience with any given emergency item, emergency type, and/or region, etc., 
avoiding thus leading participants (Katok, 2011). 
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T4: nice-to-have low-safety stock items (N 
 ). 
In the joint decision treatments, we bundle participants’ decisions about the quantity of critical-to-
life and nice-to-have items to preposition in two joint treatments: a dissonant treatment (T5) and a 
consonant treatment (T6). In the cognitive dissonant joint decision treatment (T5), participants make 
joint inventory prepositioning decisions of a high-importance low-safety stock item (  
 ) and a low-
importance high-safety stock item (N 
 ), i.e., T1 and T2 are bundled. In the cognitive consonant joint 
decision treatment (T6), participants make joint inventory prepositioning decisions of a high-
importance high-safety stock item (  
 ) and a low-importance low-safety stock item (N 
 ), i.e., T3 and 
T4 are bundled. For simplicity, we assume no correlation between items’ demand when they are 
prepositioned jointly, similar to typical normative Newsstand research (e.g., Abdel-Malek and 
Areeratchakul, 2007; Abdel-Malek and Montanari, 2005), and no resource constraints (cf. Lau and 
Lau, 1995, 1996). These assumptions avoid introducing confounding factors, providing thus a clean 
test of the effects of cognitive dissonance. 
3.3.4. Experimental procedure 
A total of 43 people participated in our experiment. The results include decisions from 42 participants. 
We excluded 1 participant because she did not complete one of the treatments. All participants are 
full-time humanitarian practitioners working in different areas (e.g., logistics, field operations, and 
program management) for national and international organizations (e.g., Oxfam, WVI, UNHCR, 
UNICEF, WFP, and IFRC). All participants were students enrolled in an executive Master program in 
humanitarian logistics and management in a Swiss University in 2012. Table 3.1 shows the treatments 
with their corresponding notations and number of participants and with the dissonance-related 
treatments highlighted to differentiate them from the consonance-related ones. 
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Table 3.1. Treatments, notation, and number of participants. 
  Item 
  Critical-to-Life Nice-to-Have 
S
E
P
A
R
A
T
E
 
Safety stock condition 
Low 
T1 (  
 ) 
11 
T4 (N 
 ) 
10 
High 
T3 (  
 ) 
10 
T2 (N 
 ) 
11 
J
O
IN
T
 
Safety stock condition 
Low 
T5 (  
 ) 
11 
T6 (N 
 ) 
10 
High 
T6 (  
 ) 
10 
T5 (N 
 ) 
11 
 
All sessions were conducted in classroom as a class exercise; monetary rewards were not used. 
Protocols of experimental economics (Smith, 1976, 1982) call for performance-based monetary 
rewards. However, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) document a number of experiments showing that the 
improvement in performance expected by using monetary rewards is not observed. Similarly, Arkes 
(1991) shows that financially motivated individuals may perform suboptimal behaviors with more 
enthusiasm. Moreover, Osterloh and Frey (2002) and Perry et al. (2006) show that financial incentives 
may be ineffective in stimulating socially motivated actions, e.g., humanitarian actions. The effect of 
monetary rewards in a prepositioning task is left for future research. 
Participants arrived, received instructions (see Appendix 3.1) and were seated so that they could 
not see decisions from other participants. They were informed that the purpose of the experiment was 
to understand how humanitarian practitioners make inventory prepositioning decisions. Participants 
had time to ask clarifying questions before initiating the simulation. After the instructions, they were 
directed to a web simulator with a randomly assigned treatment. The simulator was developed in Forio 
Business Simulations (www.forio.com). The simulator contained an introduction screen with 
information about the types of items and the need to preposition items in preparation for emergencies. 
The introduction screen also reminded participants about the basic characteristics of the decisions they 
were about to make. In all treatments, participants had to make 30 consecutive inventory 
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prepositioning decisions. After they entered their decisions, the system automatically revealed the 
demand realization(s) and cost(s). At any time, participants had access to information about 
prepositioning and expediting costs w and x, respectively. They also had access to all previous 
decisions and outcomes, including demand realizations, costs and total cumulative costs. This 
information was presented both in tables and graphs (Appendix 3.2 shows a snapshot of the game 
screen). 
Given the difficulty in having access to a pool of humanitarian practitioners, we ran a within-
subjects design along the dissonance-related (T1-T2 and T5) and the consonance-related (T3-T4 and 
T6) treatments, i.e., we ran two samples of participants through our treatments. Each sample of 
participants made separate decisions in the first experimental session, and joint decisions in a second 
session one day later. For example, in one of the first sessions, half of the participants in one sample 
made 30 separate inventory prepositioning decisions about a critical-to-life low-safety stock item   
  
(T1), and then 30 separate decisions about a nice-to-have high-safety stock item N 
  (T2). The other 
half of the sample first played T2 followed by T1, allowing us to control for order of presentation 
effects in separate decision treatments. In the second experimental session the following day, the same 
sample of participants played the cognitive dissonant joint decision treatment   
 , N 
  (T5). A similar 
procedure was followed for the consonant-related treatments (T3-T4 and T6). Notice that participants 
participated in the joint decision treatments always after separate decision ones. The choice to have 
separate treatments always before joint ones allows us to run a clean test for separate decisions without 
priming participants with a reference that could affect their separate decisions. Hence, we purposely 
did not control for order of presentation effects between separate and joint decision treatments. 
3.4. RESULTS 
3.4.1. Newsvendor biases in inventory prepositioning decisions 
The main unit of analysis used to compare results across treatments is the population of participants’ 
average prepositioned quantities over time, i.e., we compare populations of participants’ averages over 
time since it is individual participants, not groups of participants, that exhibit behavioral patterns (Rudi 
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and Drake, 2011). For example, the average quantity of critical-to-life items (C) prepositioned in a 
low-safety stock condition (L) in the baseline separate treatment (S) is given by (  
 ): 
 
  
    
∑     i
 
i     
 
〈  
 〉
 (3.1) 
 
where     i
  is the average quantity of critical-to-life items prepositioned by participant i across all 
rounds and 〈  
 〉 is the number of participants in the treatment. 
We tested for the pull-to-center behavior described in traditional Newsvendor experiments. Table 
3.2 provides the mean, standard error and 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (Appendix 3.3 provides 
an explanation) of the average quantities prepositioned in the four baseline treatments. The results for 
the baseline treatments are consistent with typical Newsvendor biased inventory ordering behavior. In 
particular, none of the confidence intervals around the average inventory prepositioning behavior 
contains the optimal inventory prepositioning quantity. Moreover, in all the baseline treatments there 
is a violation of the pull-to-center region since all the intervals include the mean, a robust result within 
the literature (e.g., Rudi and Drake, 2011; Thomas et al., 2007). 
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Table 3.2. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of average inventory prepositioning behaviors. 
  ̅ SE CI Pull-to-center region 
Separate decision treatments 
  
  44.42 5.59 [32.89   54.46] [25   50] 
N 
  44.17 5.20 [33.08   53.52] [50   75] 
  
  51.84 4.00 [43.84   59.56] [50   75] 
N 
  45.72 4.43 [36.39   53.74] [25   50] 
Joint decision treatments 
  
  51.19 5.96 [37.98   61.50] [25   50] 
N 
  41.28 5.59 [30.83   51.97] [50   75] 
  
  59.77 4.09 [51.47   67.33] [50   75] 
N 
  43.30 4.25 [33.56   50.74] [25   50] 
 
Table 3.2 also provides the mean, standard error and 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for the 
average quantities prepositioned in the two joint decision treatments. The results for the joint decision 
treatments are consistent with typical Newsvendor biased ordering behavior since none of the 
confidence intervals around the average inventory prepositioning behavior contains the optimal 
inventory prepositioning quantity. Compared to separate decision treatments, however, the results 
seem to be consistent with the different hypotheses since it appears that dissonant and consonant 
decisions strengthen and lessen the pull-to-center effect for high-importance items, respectively, 
whereas it appears that biased inventory ordering behavior for low-importance items is not influenced 
by dissonance and consonance. 
3.4.2. Baseline results: separate decision treatments 
As a first step, we tested for order of presentation effects in the baseline treatments using Wilcoxon 
Rank-Sum tests (Appendix 3.3 provides an explanation). The results are consistent with no order of 
presentation effects since Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests show that we cannot statistically rule out the 
possibility that there is a similar average inventory prepositioning behavior regardless of the order of 
presentation for   
  (W = 26, z = –0.73, p-value2 tails = 0.4652, r = –0.22), N 
  (W = 26, z = –0.73, p-
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value2 tails = 0.4652, r = –0.22),   
  (W = 22, z = –1.15, p-value2 tails = 0.2506, r = –0.36), and N 
  (W 
= 27, z = –0.10, p-value2 tails = 0.9168, r = –0.03). Because the no order of presentation effects 
hypotheses are stated as the null, the best we can do is to fail to reject it. This result does not 
automatically allow us to accept no order of presentation effects since we could be making a type II 
error. However, observing the effect size —denoted as r— provides us with an objective measure of 
the importance of the effect (Field, 2009). Three out of four effect sizes (in absolute value) have a low 
(N 
 ) or a low-to-middle importance (  
  and N 
 ) since they are below the cut-off values of 0.10 and 
0.30, respectively (Field, 2009). Hence, the results are fairly consistent with no order of presentation 
effects. 
Here, we investigate whether participants in separate decision treatments make similar inventory 
prepositioning decisions for critical-to-life and nice-to-have items in low- and high-safety stock 
conditions (Hypotheses 1A and 1B, respectively). Visual inspection of Figure 3.1 shows no 
pronounced differences in inventory prepositioning decisions for separate decisions in the low-safety 
stock condition, while a slightly more noticeable difference in the high-safety stock condition. A 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test shows that we cannot statistically rule out the possibility that participants 
make similar inventory prepositioning decisions for critical-to-life and nice-to-have items both in a 
low- safety stock (H1A:   
  and N 
 ) and in a high-safety stock (H1B: N 
  and   
 ) condition (H1A: W 
= 112, z = 0.14, p-value2 tails = 0.8880, r = 0.03 — H1B: W = 123, z = 0.92, p-value2 tails = 0.3600, r = 
0.20). In addition, the effect size for the low-safety stock condition has a low importance since it is 
below the cut-off value of 0.10, whereas the effect size for the high-safety stock condition has a low-
to-middle importance since it is below the cut-off value of 0.30 (Field, 2009). Hence, our results are 
fairly consistent with hypotheses H1A and H1B. Together, they suggest that in absence of a reference 
provided by a joint decision, participants treat inventory prepositioning decisions for critical-to-life 
and nice-to-have items (in the same safety stock condition) similarly when making separate decisions. 
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Figure 3.1. Average inventory prepositioning behaviors in separate decision treatments. 
 
3.4.3. Cognitive dissonant joint treatment’s results 
Although we did not control for order of presentation effects between the separate and the joint 
decision treatments in the design to avoid priming participants in separate decision treatments with a 
prior experimental reference, we tested for learning. Evidence of learning in joint decision treatments, 
which are performed after the separate ones, would suggest that the separate treatments influence 
decisions in our within-subjects design. To test for learning, we ran the following fixed-effects 
regression in each treatment: 
 
|    i  t   1
     
 
 |    
 
    
1
t    
2
  eri  t      n eri  t    i    i  t  t   1   2  (3.2) 
 
where the dependent variable captures participants’ tendency to get closer to the optimal inventory 
prepositioning quantity over time, t refers to round, Overi, t and Underi, t refer to the amount of excess 
and short of demand items of participant i in round t, respectively, and serve as a control for demand 
chasing effects, vi is the participants’ effect, and  i, t is the error term.. Evidence of learning, provided 
by a significant and negative round coefficient, is observed for   
  only. However, if the order of 
presentation had a learning effect, it would be evident in the first rounds through differences between 
  
  and   
 . We tested for such differences with a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test (Appendix 3.3 provides 
an explanation) instead of a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test given the within-subjects design along these 
treatments. We could not observe differences in the first ten rounds. Specifically, our results show that 
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we cannot statistically rule out the possibility that there is a similar average inventory prepositioning 
behavior between   
  and   
  in the first ten rounds (T = 25, z = –0.25, p-value2 tails = 0.7989, r = –
0.06). In addition, the effect size (in absolute value) has a low importance since it is below the cut-off 
value of 0.10 (Field, 2009). Hence, the results are fairly consistent with no learning from having the 
separate decision treatments before the joint decision ones. 
Here, the separate decision treatments set benchmarks for expected behavior without the joint 
manipulation treatments. The first joint treatment hypotheses explore the potential impact of 
dissonance as well as salience. Hypothesis 2A tests whether in a low-safety stock condition the 
prepositioned quantity of high-importance items in a cognitive dissonant joint decision treatment will 
be larger than that of high-importance items in a separate decision treatment. That is, the hypothesis 
explores in a low-safety stock condition how participants change their inventory prepositioning 
decisions for a high-importance item due to the availability of a dissonant reference (the low-
importance high-safety stock item) in a joint decision treatment. A different prepositioned amount 
suggests that the availability of the reference influences participants’ decisions. Higher prepositioned 
amounts in the cognitive dissonant joint decision treatment imply a larger distance to the optimum, 
which indicates that cognitive dissonant joint decisions for a high-importance item in a low-safety 
stock condition strengthen the pull-to-center effect. Visual inspection of Figure 3.2 seems to support 
this conclusion. A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test shows that the strengthening holds statistically since the 
prepositioning quantity for the critical-to-life (high-importance) item in the cognitive dissonant joint 
decision treatment (  
 ) is significantly above the quantity for the critical-to-life item in its separate 
decision counterpart (  
 ) (T = 8, z = –2.22, p-value1 tail = 0.0131, r = –0.47). Hence, the test supports 
Hypothesis 2A and suggests a strengthening of the pull-to-center effect in the cognitive dissonant joint 
decision treatment for the high-importance item. 
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Figure 3.2. Average inventory prepositioning behaviors in dissonance-related treatments. 
 
Hypothesis 2B tests whether the salience of the high-importance item leads to less attention to the 
low-importance item. In particular, it tests whether in a high-safety stock condition the prepositioned 
quantity of low-importance items in a cognitive dissonant joint decision treatment will be similar to 
that of low-importance items in a separate decision treatment. That is, the hypothesis explores in a 
high-safety stock condition how participants change their inventory prepositioning decisions for a low-
importance item due to the availability of a salient and dissonant reference (the high-importance low-
safety stock item) in a joint decision treatment. Hypothesis 2B states that the quantity of low-
importance high-safety stock items prepositioned in a cognitive dissonant joint decision treatment will 
be similar to the quantity of low-importance high-safety stock items prepositioned in a separate 
decision treatment. Visual inspection of Figure 3.2 does not suggest a pronounced difference. A 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test shows that we cannot statistically rule out the possibility that there is a 
similar prepositioned quantity between nice-to-have (low-importance) items in the cognitive dissonant 
joint decision treatment (N 
 ) and the separate decision counterpart (N 
 ) (T = 24, z = –0.80, p-value2 
tails = 0.4236, r = –0.17). In addition, the effect size (in absolute value) has a low-to-middle 
importance since it is below the cut-off value of 0.30 (Field, 2009). 
Hence, our results are fairly consistent with hypotheses H2A and H2B. Together, they suggest that 
participants (a) in a low-safety stock condition prepositioning high-importance items strengthen the 
pull-to-center effect when making cognitive dissonant joint decisions and (b) in a high-safety stock 
condition prepositioning low-importance items present a similar pull-to-center effect in cognitive 
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dissonant joint and separate decision treatments. Our results suggest that the availability of a 
dissonant reference in the joint decision treatment (a) influences participants’ inventory prepositioning 
behavior for high-importance items and (b) does not for low-importance ones. We conjecture that 
participants pay more attention to the salient decisions (high-importance item) to the detriment of 
other ones (low-importance item) when making cognitive dissonant joint decisions. 
3.4.4. Cognitive consonant joint treatment’s results 
Here, we explore the potential impact of consonance and, again, salience. Hypothesis 3A tests whether 
in a high-safety stock condition the prepositioned quantity of high-importance items in a cognitive 
consonant joint decision treatment will be larger than that of high-importance items in a separate 
decision treatment. That is, the hypothesis explores in a high-safety stock condition how participants 
change their inventory prepositioning decisions for a high-importance item due to the availability of a 
consonant reference (the low-importance low-safety stock item) in a joint decision treatment. Again, a 
different prepositioned amount suggests that the availability of the reference influences participants’ 
decisions. Higher prepositioned amounts in the cognitive consonant joint decision treatment imply a 
shorter distance to the optimum, which indicates that cognitive consonant joint decisions for a high-
importance item in a high-safety stock condition lessen the pull-to-center effect. Visual inspection of 
Figure 3.3 seems to support this conclusion. A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test shows that the statistical 
result holds at the 10% significance level. The prepositioning quantity for the critical-to-life (high-
importance) item in the cognitive consonant joint decision treatment (  
 ) is marginally significantly 
above the quantity for the critical-to-life item in its separate decision counterpart (  
 ) (T = 13, z = –
1.48, p-value1 tail = 0.0697, r = –0.33). Hence, the test marginally supports Hypothesis 3A and 
suggests a lessening of the pull-to-center effect in the cognitive consonant joint decision treatment for 
the high-importance item. 
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Figure 3.3. Average inventory prepositioning behaviors in consonance-related treatments. 
 
Hypothesis 3B again tests whether the salience of the high-importance item leads to less attention 
to the low-importance item. In particular, it tests whether in a low-safety stock condition the 
prepositioned quantity of low-importance items in a cognitive consonant joint decision treatment will 
be similar to that of low-importance items in a separate decision treatment. That is, the hypothesis 
explores in a low-safety stock condition how participants change their inventory prepositioning 
decisions for a low-importance item due to the availability of a salient and consonant reference (the 
high-importance high-safety stock item) in a joint decision treatment. Hypothesis 3B states that the 
quantity of low-importance low-safety stock items prepositioned in a cognitive consonant joint 
decision treatment will be similar to the quantity of low-importance low-safety stock items 
prepositioned in a separate decision treatment. Visual inspection of Figure 3.3 does not suggest a 
pronounced difference. A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test shows that we cannot statistically rule out the 
possibility that there is a similar prepositioned quantity between nice-to-have (low-importance) items 
in the cognitive consonant joint decision treatment (N 
 ) and the separate decision counterpart (N 
 ) (T 
= 15, z = –1.27, p-value2 tails = 0.2026, r = –0.28). In addition, the effect size (in absolute value) has a 
low-to-middle importance since it is below the cut-off value of 0.30 (Field, 2009). 
Hence, our results are fairly consistent with hypotheses H3A and H3B. Together, they suggest that 
participants (a) in a high-safety stock condition prepositioning high-importance items lessen the pull-
to-center effect when making cognitive consonant joint decisions and (b) in a low-safety stock 
condition prepositioning low-importance items present a similar pull-to-center effect in cognitive 
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consonant joint and separate decision treatments. Our results suggest that the availability of a 
consonant reference in the joint decision treatment once more (a) influences participants’ inventory 
prepositioning behavior for high-importance items and (b) does not for low-importance ones. The 
results for participants making cognitive consonant joint decisions also provide support to our 
conjecture that they pay more attention to the salient decisions (high-importance item) to the detriment 
of other ones (low-importance item). 
3.4.5. Summary of results 
Table 3.3 presents a summary of the overall results for our hypotheses (H1 – H3). The results suggest 
that participants treat inventory prepositioning decisions for high- and low-importance items in the 
same safety stock condition similarly in the separate decision treatments. Moreover, our results 
suggest that the availability of a dissonant and consonant reference in the cognitive dissonant joint and 
cognitive consonant joint decision treatments, respectively, (a) influences participants’ inventory 
prepositioning behavior for high-importance items and (b) does not for low-importance ones. Our 
results show that inventory prepositioning decisions are influenced by bundled decision making. In 
particular, we find that for high-importance items (a) cognitive consonant joint decisions marginally 
reduce the pull-to-center effect; and (b) cognitive dissonant joint decisions increase the pull-to-center 
effect. We also find that low-importance items are not influenced by our dissonant or consonant 
treatments. These results are consistent with our hypotheses. 
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Table 3.3. Summary of hypothesis tests. 
 H0 Statistic z p-value r Support? 
1A   
  – N 
      W = 112 0.14 0.8880
a
 0.03 Consistent 
1B   
  – N 
      W = 123 0.92 0.3600
a
 0.20 Consistent 
       
2A   
  –   
  ≤   T = 8 -2.22 0.0131
b
 -0.47 High 
2B N 
  – N 
      T =24 -0.80 0.4236
a
 -0.17 Consistent 
       
3A   
  –   
  ≤   T = 13 -1.48 0.0697
b
 -0.33 Marginal 
3B N 
  – N 
      T = 15 -1.27 0.2026
a
 -0.28 Consistent 
a 2-tailed p-value, b 1-tailed p-value. 
 
3.5. DISCUSSION 
This research presents the results of a Newsvendor experiment in which individuals make joint 
inventory prepositioning decisions for two items of different importance. In such setting, individuals’ 
decisions are prone to the pull-to-center effect commonly observed in traditional profit-based 
Newsvendor experiments. To influence their decisions, we design a framework to create either a 
cognitive dissonant treatment, by bundling a high-importance low-safety stock item with a low-
importance high-safety stock one; or a cognitive consonant one, by bundling a high-importance high-
safety stock item with a low-importance low-safety stock one. Our results show that inventory 
prepositioning decisions are influenced by bundled decision making. In particular, we find that for 
high-importance items (a) cognitive consonant joint decisions reduce the pull-to-center effect; and (b) 
cognitive dissonant joint decisions increase the pull-to-center effect. We also find that low-importance 
items are not influenced by our dissonant or consonant treatments. We conjecture that individuals pay 
attention to high-importance items to the detriment of low-importance ones. 
Our results have implications to the way Newsvendor inventory ordering decisions are potentially 
framed. In humanitarian settings, a cognitive consonant joint decision mechanism for perishable items 
(e.g., vaccines, pharmaceutical drugs, ready-to-use therapeutic foods) may be implemented combining 
decisions for critical items with non-critical ones. Both decisions may be bundled in order to reduce 
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the pull-to-center effect obtained with high-importance items, increasing not only decisions’ cost-
effectiveness but also items’ availability. In industrial settings, a cognitive consonant joint decision 
framework may be implemented anytime a high-profit product is perceived as more important than a 
low-profit product. Both decisions may be bundled in order to increase the expected profits achieved 
on the high-profit product. In addition, a cognitive dissonant joint decision framework may be 
implemented when a strategic item is costly but critical (e.g., a low-profit part with long replenishment 
delays) in order to increase its availability and customer service satisfaction. Also, bundling inventory 
ordering decisions of different importance items in different safety stock conditions is presumably 
easier and less costly to implement than strategies that seek to align multiple partners and coordinate 
their decisions (e.g., a buyer and a supplier, or coordinating relief response across multiple 
organizations). 
The proposed Newsvendor framework is aligned with the more practical case of the Newsstand 
problem (multi-product Newsvendor problem) and is closer to reality than previous experiments. 
Hence, it represents an improvement with respect to the external validity of previous experiments 
(Smith, 1982) and extends Newsvendor research according to Khouja’s (1999) recommendations. The 
context of the experiment —inventory prepositioning in preparation to emergency response— is also 
novel and shows the application of the Newsvendor model in a non-traditional (non-profit based) 
operational setting, extending Newsvendor research as well. 
Methodologically, we believe that the proposed framework can be generalized to traditional 
manufacturing and profit-based Newsvendor settings. The conditions for the framework to apply are 
established given a difference between the importance of items and their safety stock levels. 
Nevertheless, the novelty of the experimental setting imposes additional hurdles that could be 
addressed with future research. First, future research could explore whether individuals making 
inventory ordering decisions of different importance items stocked at the same safety stock level 
would also be influenced by the framework. Second, to generalize our findings, future research could 
explore how the proposed framework influences decisions in more traditional manufacturing and 
profit-based settings. Third, the treatments were conducted with a small number of humanitarian 
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practitioners. This is a difficult pool of participants to have access to. Future research could test more 
traditional pool of individuals such as undergraduate, graduate, or MBA students. In addition, one 
could compare the behavior of humanitarian practitioners to that of students to analyze whether 
previous experience with inventory prepositioning decisions or humanitarian settings affects overall 
behavior. Fourth, we did not control for order of presentation effects between the separate and the joint 
decision treatments. The separate treatments were presented first to avoid priming individuals with a 
prior experimental reference. Future work could explore how a reference obtained from a prior joint 
decision treatment may affect separate decisions. Finally, to run a clean test of the effects of cognitive 
dissonance, the decision task assumed, e.g., certainty in disaster occurrence (cf. Lodree Jr. and Taskin, 
2008), no correlation between items’ demand (cf. Anupindi and Akella, 1993), and no resource 
constraints (cf. Lau and Lau, 1995, 1996). Future work could relax these assumptions one by one and 
in combination to explore how they affect the proposed effects. 
We also acknowledge the novelty of the application of cognitive dissonance and the challenges that 
it imposes. First, the conjectures about consonance effects are exploratory. Future work could 
systematically explore consonance effects. Second, future research could systematically explore 
possible magnitude effects of reactions to dissonant or consonant states. A priori one may argue that 
unpleasant dissonant states may trigger stronger reactions than consonant ones; however, there are no 
theoretical grounds to make such claims. Further exploration of consonance effects and the strength of 
reactions to dissonant or consonant states could contribute to Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance 
theory. 
Furthermore, our hypotheses testing the similarity in quantity amounts in (i) the separate decision 
treatments (H1A and H1B) and (ii) the low-importance items in the joint decision treatments (H2B 
and H3B) are stated in the traditional way, i.e., as the null (H0). Our inability to reject them does not 
immediately allow us to accept them since we could be making a type II error —accepting the null 
when it is in fact false—. Power Analysis (Cohen, 1988) could potentially be used to ensure that the 
probability of a type II error would be negligible; however, the likely number of observations required 
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would be large (Cohen, 1990). Future work could use Power Analysis in the design of an improved 
experiment with a larger sample size. 
In summary, our results suggest that a joint decision framework stressing cognitive dissonance may 
influence Newsvendor inventory ordering decisions. In particular, bundling Newsvendor inventory 
ordering decisions that differ in importance may help decision makers lessen (or strengthen) the 
traditional pull-to-center effect. We hope that this work can prompt further research and interest on 
possible mechanisms that can debias inventory ordering decisions in Newsvendor experiments. 
 
Appendix 3.1. Sample of written instructions (joint decision treatment) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE GAME 
You are a senior supply manager in a large Humanitarian Organization (HO) that provides relief 
during emergencies. When preparing for emergencies, you must preposition two kinds of emergency 
items: 
   -  Critical-to-Life items: These items are critical to life; they must be available to prevent the loss of 
lives. 
   -  Nice-to-Have items: These items are nice to have as they alleviate adverse conditions. 
In this game, you must decide the quantity of Critical-to-Life and Nice-to-Have items to preposition 
(purchase) to prepare for regional emergencies. Your preposition decisions influences the time 
beneficiaries get the items they need and the cost that the HO must pay. For simplicity, for each kind 
of item, assume that each beneficiary demands exactly one item. Moreover, the quantities demanded 
for both kinds of items are independent of each other (i.e., they are not necessarily the same). If 
beneficiary demand is lower than the amount prepositioned, they get the items promptly (and the HO 
meets beneficiary demand at purchase cost). If beneficiary demand is higher than the amount 
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prepositioned, the excess demand will get the items with a delay (and the HO will pay an additional 
cost for expediting the excess items). 
For each emergency, your preposition decisions must be made before you know for certain what the 
beneficiary demands are. Based on past emergencies, however, you know that the required number of 
items for each kind of item is uniformly distributed between 1 and 100 items. That is, there is a 1/100 
chance that beneficiary demand will be 1, a 1/100 chance that beneficiary demand will be 2, and so on. 
Moreover, emergencies are independent of each other. That is, a small or large beneficiary demand in 
one emergency has no influence on whether beneficiary demand is small or large in future 
emergencies. 
 
GOAL 
Your goal is to minimize the total costs accumulated during the span of the game (60 decisions, 30 
emergencies). 
 
PLAYING THE GAME 
To access the game, follow the link [game link]. 
 
DECISIONS 
Please write down your preposition decisions (as you are making them) in the table provided (see 
reverse of the sheet). 
 
[Decision table] 
 
After completing all your preposition decisions, send the electronic data by e-mail by following the 
next steps: 
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- Right click on the table with your preposition decisions (the table on the upper right of the 
screen). 
- Select Copy Data. 
- Open your preferred e-mail application and start writing a new e-mail. 
- Right click on the body of the e-mail. 
- Select Paste. 
- Copy and Paste also the link of the game (web address that appears in your Internet browser) 
- Send the e-mail to: [e-mail address 1] and [e-mail address 2]. 
 
Appendix 3.2. Sample of game screen (T6) 
 
 
Figure A3.2.1. Sample of game screen. 
 
Appendix 3.3. Statistical tests 
Bootstrap confidence intervals 
We rely on bootstrap confidence intervals since we have small sample sizes and hence cannot 
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guarantee that the samples conform to the assumptions needed to compute standard confidence 
intervals. Bootstrap methods estimate the properties of the sampling distribution from the sample data 
by treating the sample as a population from which smaller samples (bootstrap samples) are taken 
(putting the data back before a new sample is drawn). The statistic of interest is calculated in each 
sample, and by taking many samples the sampling distribution can be estimated. The standard error of 
the statistic is estimated from the standard deviation of this sampling distribution. From this standard 
error, confidence intervals and significance tests can be computed (Field, 2009). The reported 
bootstrap confidence intervals are bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals, for which 1’000 
bootstrap replications were used as suggested when computing bias-corrected intervals (Efron and 
Tibshirani, 1986). 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test 
We rely on the non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test since we have small sample sizes and hence 
cannot guarantee that the samples conform to the assumptions needed to run the independent (or 
unpaired data) t-test. The Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test is the non-parametric equivalent of the 
independent t-test. The test rests on the calculation of a statistic that compares the ranked data from the 
two samples of interest. When the data from both samples are ranked from lowest to highest ignoring 
the samples or groups to which the data belonged, then one would expect the higher ranks to be in one 
group and the lower ranks to be in the other group in case there was a difference between the groups; 
specifically, if one added up the ranks, then one would expect the summed total of ranks in each group 
to be different. When the groups have unequal number of observations in them, the test statistic W is 
the sum of ranks in the group that contains the fewer observations; it is the smaller summed rank 
otherwise (Field, 2009). To determine if the statistic is significant, the statistic can be converted to a z-
score; W~N(n1(n1+n2+1)/2, sqrt(n1n2(n1+n2+1)/12)). It has been shown that the normal approximation 
appears appropriate very quickly (Bellera et al., 2010). 
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Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test 
The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test is used since, besides having small sample sizes, T1-T2 are not 
independent from T5 given the within-subjects design along them (the same applies for T3-T4 and T6). 
The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test is the non-parametric equivalent of the dependent (or paired data) t-
test. The test rests on the calculation of a statistic that compares the ranked differences between the 
observations of interest. Once the differences have been calculated, they are ranked the same way as 
with the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test, but the sign of the difference is assigned to the rank. Then, the 
ranks that came from a positive difference between the groups are collected and added up to get the 
sum of positive ranks T+. The same is done with the negative differences to get T–. The test statistic T 
is the smaller of the two values (Field, 2009). To determine if the statistic is significant, the statistic 
can be converted to a z-score; T~N(n(n+1)/4, sqrt(n(n+1)(2n+1)/24)). It has been shown that the 
normal approximation appears appropriate very quickly (Bellera et al., 2010). 
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CHAPTER 4 
INVENTORY ORDERING DECISIONS IN A SINGLE 
ECHELON: THE EFFECT OF BACKORDERS 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper studies supplier inventory ordering behavior in a Newsvendor extension to the case of 
backorders in order to assess (i) the effect of backorders on inventory ordering behavior in a simple 
inventory system and (ii) whether suppliers realize the benefits of an inventory system with backorders 
compared to one with lost sales. The paper presents results from a laboratory (lab) experiment that 
compares individuals’ inventory ordering behavior in the Newsvendor extension to the case of 
backorders to that observed in the traditional —lost sales— Newsvendor inventory system in both 
low- and high-safety stock conditions. Consistent with a theoretical comparison of both inventory 
models, results show that backorders drive individuals’ inventory ordering quantities upwards 
compared to lost sales. In addition, consistent with behavioral arguments based on reference 
dependence and misperceptions of feedback, results show that individuals react to shortages in a 
stronger manner when unmet demand is backlogged than when is lost and underweight backorders 
when making inventory ordering decisions, respectively. These findings suggest that suppliers may 
benefit in terms of profits and/or customer service satisfaction by backlogging rather than losing 
unmet demand. 
Keywords: Backorders, Behavioral Operations Management, Laboratory Experiments, Lost Sales, 
Newsvendor Model. 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Inventory shortages occur when the amount of a given product in stock falls short of a customer’s 
order. They are often an indicator of suboptimal supply chain performance (Lee and Lodree Jr., 2010) 
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and are usually classified as lost sales, backorders, or partial backorders —a fraction of the shortage is 
lost and the remaining fraction is backlogged—. Backorders incur increased administrative costs, 
potential emergency transportation costs, and cost of delayed revenue, among others. Lost sales costs 
are sometimes even more expensive than backorders costs given the opportunity cost of lost revenue 
and the loss of customer goodwill or loyalty associated with the former (Lodree Jr., 2007). Hence, 
suppliers frequently offer economic incentives to customers to place a backorder rather than risk 
losing sales (DeCroix and Arreola-Risa, 1998). 
How suppliers should make inventory ordering decisions when unmet demand is backlogged is 
hence a relevant issue for business success. Accordingly, it has been largely addressed from a 
normative point of view. A number of studies have modeled optimal supplier inventory ordering 
behavior along with the option of emergency replenishments to fill backorders (e.g., Gallego and 
Moon, 1993; Khouja, 1996; Lodree Jr. et al., 2008). Others have modeled optimal supplier inventory 
ordering behavior in non-competitive environments or those in which a customer either places 
backorders or leaves without making a purchase (e.g., Lee and Lodree Jr., 2010; Lodree Jr., 2007), 
whereas others have added to the analysis the option of offering incentives to customers to place 
backorders (e.g., Cheung, 1998; DeCroix and Arreola-Risa, 1998). Also, I am aware of one study that 
has addressed both issues —supplier inventory ordering behavior and customer incentives— in 
competitive environments or those in which a customer can switch to competing suppliers (Netessine 
et al., 2006)
9
. 
To the best of my knowledge, no previous work has tested behaviorally any of the previous models. 
However, behavioral research in Operations Management studying both the Newsvendor pull-to-
center effect and the Beer Game bullwhip effect offers some insights about how individuals place 
inventory orders when unmet demand is backlogged. On the Newsvendor side, Bloomfield and Kulp 
                                                          
9 Although there are other normative studies addressing optimal supplier inventory ordering behavior in competitive 
environments (e.g., Gaur and Park, 2007; Liu et al., 2007), their main interest is on analyzing customer switching behaviors. 
Hence, for the most part, they assume lost sales and do not consider the option of offering incentives to customers to place 
backorders. 
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(2013) studied how individuals react to product durability in a single-echelon inventory ordering lab 
experiment. They showed that just as Newsvendors tend to adjust orders insufficiently to over and 
under stocking costs when the product is perishable and unmet demand is lost (e.g., Bolton and Katok, 
2008; Bostian et al., 2008; Kremer et al., 2010; Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000), they also tend to adjust 
orders insufficiently to inventory and backorders when the product is non-perishable and unmet 
demand is backlogged. On the Beer Game side, lab experiments have consistently shown that 
individuals tend to underweight orders in transit, ordering too much when orders in transit call for 
smaller orders and too little when orders in transit call for larger orders (e.g., Croson and Donohue, 
2006; Steckel et al., 2004; Sterman, 1989; Wu and Katok, 2006). 
Both Newsvendor and Beer Game research have identified what appears to be a robust 
underweighting of backorders. Nevertheless, I add to this body of research by running a Newsvendor 
experiment in a simple yet informative experimental design that varies whether unmet demand is 
backlogged and product safety stock (or profitability) level, addressing two gaps. On the one hand, 
previous experiments (e.g., Croson and Donohue, 2006; Steckel et al., 2004; Sterman, 1989; Wu and 
Katok, 2006) portray too complex inventory systems in which cross-echelon coordination, gaming, or 
some other unspecified dynamics driven by individuals’ interactions are not accounted for and, hence, 
the causes of biased inventory ordering behavior cannot be clearly ascribed to them or to particular 
product and/or environmental characteristics (Bloomfield and Kulp, 2013). In order to run a clean test 
of the effect of backorders on inventory ordering behavior, I assume a single-echelon inventory system 
with no inventory accumulation, isolating further the effect of backorders on inventory ordering 
behavior. 
On the other hand, Bloomfield and Kulp (2013) focused more on how individuals react to product 
durability and not to safety stock levels and, hence, they controlled for safety stock level by equating 
under and over stocking costs. In addition, to the best of my knowledge, Beer Game research has 
exclusively studied inventory ordering behavior when under stocking costs are greater than over 
stocking costs. However, inventory ordering patterns may differ across different safety stock levels as 
suggested in Newsvendor research (e.g., Bolton and Katok, 2008; Chen et al., 2013; Ho et al., 2010; 
66 
Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000). Hence, I assume two different safety stock conditions in order to 
assess the effect of an inventory system with backorders on inventory ordering behavior across 
different safety stock levels. 
I thus run a Newsvendor experiment in a 2x2 between-subjects design with lost sales vs. backorders 
and low- vs. high-safety stock condition to assess the effect of an inventory system with backorders on 
inventory ordering behavior more accurately. I provide normative arguments based on Bulinskaya’s 
(1964) Newsvendor problem extension to the case of backorders and behavioral arguments based on 
reference dependence- (Ho et al., 2010), loss aversion- (Harinck et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2009) and 
misperceptions of feedback- (e.g., Bloomfield and Kulp, 2013; Croson and Donohue, 2006; Sterman, 
1989) related behaviors to explain the effect of an inventory system with backorders on inventory 
ordering behavior. In doing so, I also provide a behavioral test of the Newsvendor problem with 
backorders (Bulinskaya, 1964), which has not been previously tested behaviorally to the best of my 
knowledge. 
In addition to contribute to the Behavioral Operations Management literature by accounting more 
accurately for the effect of an inventory system with backorders on inventory ordering behavior, I also 
contribute to the literature on incentives to backorders. Although an inventory system with backorders 
may be more beneficial to business compared to an inventory system with lost sales (DeCroix and 
Arreola-Risa, 1998; Lodree Jr., 2007), research is lacking on whether suppliers actually realize the 
benefits of the former compared to the latter by modifying their inventory ordering behavior 
accordingly. Hence, I also add to the literature on incentive to backorders (e.g., DeCroix and Arreola-
Risa, 1998; Lodree Jr., 2007; Netessine et al., 2006) by comparing inventory ordering behavior in an 
inventory system with backorders to that of an inventory system with lost sales across different safety 
stock conditions to assess whether suppliers realize the benefits of an inventory system with 
backorders. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the Newsvendor problem with 
backorders and develops hypotheses based on normative and behavioral arguments. Section 4.3 
presents the lab experiment, describing its design and the experimental procedure. Section 4.4 presents 
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the main results and hypothesis tests. Finally, section 4.5 summarizes the work and discusses the main 
findings, implications, limitations, and opportunities for future research. 
4.2. NEWSVENDOR PROBLEM WITH BACKORDERS 
4.2.1. Normative implications 
In the Newsvendor problem (Arrow et al., 1951), a manager places an order quantity q at unit cost c 
facing an uncertain demand D in a single selling season. Once D is realized, the manager faces either 
an over stock or an under stock. If q exceeds D, then D units are sold and q – D units incur a disposal 
cost h. That is, unit over stock cost h. For simplicity, and following previous Newsvendor 
experiments, I assume no disposal cost. That is, the only cost associated with an over stock is the 
purchasing cost c associated with the units in excess of demand. If D exceeds q, then q units are sold 
and D – q units incur a shortage cost p. That is, unit under stock cost equals p. If D is a random 
variable with cdf F, it is well-known that the optimal inventory ordering quantity Q
*
 is a base-stock 
policy characterized by the critical fractile: 
 
  ( 
 )   
  –   
 
 (4.1) 
 
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) define a product as a high-safety stock (or high-profit) product when 
FL(Q
*) ≥ 1/2 and as a low-safety stock (or low-profit) product otherwise. 
In Bulinskaya’s (1964) Newsvendor problem extension to the case of backorders, periods cannot be 
longer separated since a shortage in a given period carries over to the following period. However, 
when the shortage (backorder) cost p is charged per unit per unit time —backorder costs are assessed 
based on both the amount and length of backorders—, a base-stock policy is still optimal as shown by 
Bulinskaya (1964). In particular, the optimal inventory ordering quantity Q
*
 is characterized by the 
critical fractile: 
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 (4.2) 
 
Notice that both FB and FL change non-linearly to changes in the shortage cost p —FB'(p) = c/(p + 
c)
2
 and FL'(p) = c/p
2—. FB also changes non-linearly to changes in the purchasing cost c —FB'(c) = –
p/(p + c)
2—. FL, on the other hand, changes linearly to changes in c —FL'(c) = –1/p—, serving hence 
as a simple yet informative reference to compare both inventory systems. Holding p constant, Figure 
4.1 shows how increasing values of c affects both FL and FB.
10
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Optimality behavior to increasing values of the purchasing cost c. 
 
Figure 4.1 reveals that Bulinskaya’s (1964) Newsvendor problem extension to the case of 
backorders leads to larger optimal inventory orders than the traditional Newsvendor problem. 
Penalties due to backorders endures more than the ones due to lost sales since a shortage in a given 
period carries over to following periods until it is filled. Accordingly, the prospect of backorders 
                                                          
10 The value of c at which a given difference between both inventory systems is observed changes proportionally to changes 
in p. For instance, doubling p implies that the difference now observed for c = 1 will be observed for c = 2. In other words, 
the difference between both inventory systems is qualitatively invariant to p. 
0
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induces larger inventory orders to buffer the inventory system against the endurance of shortage 
penalties. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that the amount actually ordered in the backorders case will 
be larger than the one ordered in the lost sales case. In other words, it is reasonable to expect an 
inventory system effect in the same safety stock condition. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: In the same safety stock condition, inventory ordering quantities in the 
backorders case will be larger than inventory ordering quantities in the lost 
sales case. 
Figure 4.1 also reveals that reactions to the way unmet demand is handled are different in low- and 
high-safety stock conditions. First, as mentioned previously, penalties due to shortages endure more in 
the backorders than in the lost sales case. And second, not only does the supplier have to pay a 
shortage cost in the backorders case for every unit short of demand, but she also has to pay a 
purchasing cost associated with the units short of demand to fill the backlog, cost that is larger in low- 
than in high-safety stock conditions. Hence, overall, the cost of the backlog is larger in low- than in 
high-safety stock conditions due to the larger backlog filling cost in low-safety stock conditions. 
Taken together, the prospect of backorders induces larger differences in inventory orders with respect 
to lost sales in low- than in high-safety conditions to buffer the inventory system against the high 
purchasing costs of backorders. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that the amounts actually ordered will 
lead to a larger difference in inventory orders between backorders and lost sales in low- than in high-
safety conditions. In other words, it is reasonable to expect a larger inventory system effect in low- 
than in high-safety stock conditions. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 2:  In the low-safety stock condition, differences in inventory ordering quantities 
between the backorders and lost sales cases will be larger than differences in 
inventory ordering quantities between the backorders and lost sales cases in 
the high-safety stock condition. 
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4.2.2. Behavioral implications 
From a normative point of view, Bulinskaya’s (1964) Newsvendor problem extension to the case of 
backorders should lead to larger inventory orders compared to the traditional Newsvendor problem. 
From a behavioral point of view, Ho et al.’s (2013) behavioral study of reference dependence in a 
multilocation Newsvendor problem offers some insights about the effects that backorders could have 
on inventory ordering behavior compared to lost sales. They showed that their proposed reference 
dependence model, which adds disutilities of over stocking and under stocking to traditional inventory 
multilocation models, explained their experimental data better than both standard inventory 
multilocation models and Schweitzer and Cachon’s (2000) preference model for minimizing ex post 
inventory error. In a validation experiment, Ho and colleagues manipulated the relative salience of the 
disutilities of over stocks in a low-safety stock condition to reduce the pull-to-center effect by either 
asking individuals to compute and write down the amount of leftovers and their associated profit loss 
or imposing a cash penalty for leftovers. Similarly, they manipulated the relative salience of the 
disutilities of under stocks in a high-safety stock condition to reduce the pull-to-center effect by either 
asking individuals to compute and write down the amount of shortage and their associated forgone 
profits or awarding a cash bonus for having no shortage. Ho and colleagues showed that salient 
leftovers induced smaller inventory orders in low-safety stock conditions, whereas salient shortages 
induced larger inventory orders in high-safety stock conditions, proving that their salient disutility 
manipulations were effective in reducing the pull-to-center effect. 
Compared to lost sales, backorders make shortages arguably more salient since they make 
shortages and their associated penalties to carry over to following periods until they are filled, making 
their detrimental effects to endure more in time. Building on Ho et al.’s (2013) salient disutility 
results, it is then reasonable to expect that shortages will lead to larger order adjustments when they 
are backlogged than when they are lost due to the salience that backorders arguably provide to 
shortages. In other words, it is reasonable to expect an inventory system shortage effect in the same 
safety stock condition. This leads to the third hypothesis: 
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HYPOTHESIS 3:  In the same safety stock condition, order adjustments after a shortage in the 
backorders case will be larger than order adjustments after a shortage in the 
lost sales case. 
In addition, loss aversion offers some insights about potential differences in reactions to the way 
unmet demand is handled in low- and high-safety stock conditions. Loss aversion refers to the 
phenomenon that the disutility of losses exceeds the utility of commensurate gains, i.e., losses loom 
larger than corresponding gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In the domain of losses, larger losses 
are presumably more important than smaller losses (Harinck et al., 2007; Wilson and Gilbert, 2005) 
and consequently more likely to affect behavior (Smith et al., 2009). Analyzing poker player behavior, 
Smith et al. (2009) observed that the majority of the analyzed players played more aggressively after a 
large loss than after a large win and that the fraction playing more aggressively consistently increased 
as the size of the large loss increased. A somewhat related finding is Harinck et al.’s (2007) study on 
reversed loss aversion for small amounts of money, in which they observed that, compared to large 
outcomes, loss aversion is reversed for small outcomes, i.e., gains loom larger than losses. 
As mentioned previously, the cost associated with the backlog is larger in low- than in high-safety 
stock conditions due to the larger backlog filling cost in low-safety stock conditions. Building on loss 
aversion arguments (Harinck et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2009), it is then reasonable to expect that 
shortages will lead to larger order adjustments for backorders than for lost sales in low- than in high-
safety stock conditions due to the larger cost associated with backlogged shortages in low-safety stock 
conditions. In other words, it is reasonable to expect a larger inventory system shortage effect in low- 
than in high-safety stock conditions. This leads to the fourth hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 4: In the low-safety stock condition, differences in order adjustments after a 
shortage between the backorders and lost sales cases will be larger than 
differences in order adjustments after a shortage between the backorders and 
lost sales cases in the high-safety stock condition. 
Although an inventory system with backorders should induce large inventory orders, it is not clear 
whether individuals will be closer to the optimum compared to an inventory system with lost sales. 
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This is further supported by Beer Game research studying misperceptions of feedback, which has 
consistently shown that individuals tend to underweight orders in transit, ordering too much when 
orders in transit call for smaller orders and too little when orders in transit call for larger orders (e.g., 
Croson and Donohue, 2006; Steckel et al., 2004; Sterman, 1989; Wu and Katok, 2006). In order 
words, individuals tend to underweight inventory and order too much and to underweight backorders 
and order too little. The underweighting of inventory and backorders has also been observed, although 
to a lesser extent, when POS data is available to all echelons (Croson and Donohue, 2003; Steckel et 
al., 2004), when communication prior the game is allowed or inventory information is shared among 
echelons (Croson and Donohue, 2005, 2006; Wu and Katok, 2006), when transit lags are reduced 
and/or the number of echelons is less than four (Cantor and Katok, 2012; Steckel et al., 2004), among 
others. That is, the underweighting of inventory and backorders appears robust (Croson et al., 2013). 
The underweighting of inventory and backorders has also been observed in simpler —single-
echelon— inventory systems. In particular, Bloomfield and Kulp (2013) showed that just as 
Newsvendors tend to adjust orders insufficiently to over and under stocking when the product is 
perishable and unmet demand is lost (e.g., Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al., 2008; Kremer et al., 
2010; Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000), they also tend to adjust orders insufficiently to inventory and 
backorders when the product is non-perishable and unmet demand is backlogged. Given that the 
underweighting of backorders is a robust component of biased inventory ordering behavior, it is then 
reasonable to expect an underweighting of backorders when the product is perishable and unmet 
demand is backlogged. This leads to the final hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 5:  In the backorders case, inventory ordering quantities will not be fully adjusted 
to backorders. 
4.3. LABORATORY EXPERIMENT 
I follow Bloomfield and Kulp (2013) and run a single-echelon inventory ordering lab experiment to 
control for potential cross-echelon coordination, gaming, or some other unspecified dynamics driven 
by individuals’ interactions not accounted for in Beer Game experiments. I further simplify 
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Bloomfield and Kulp’s (2013) setup by assuming no inventory accumulation, providing thus a clean 
test for the effect of backorders on inventory ordering behavior. Unlike Bloomfield and Kulp (2013), I 
also include high- and low-safety stock levels since Newsvendor research suggests that behavioral 
effects may differ across different safety stock levels (e.g., Bolton and Katok, 2008; Chen et al., 2013; 
Ho et al., 2010; Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000), not to mention the different reactions of optimality to 
the way unmet demand is handled in low- and high-safety stock conditions observed in Figure 1. 
4.3.1. Experimental design 
I set unit shortage cost at p = 4 and manipulate unit purchasing cost c. In particular, I set unit 
purchasing cost for high-safety stock items at c = 1, and for low-safety stock items at c = 3. I consider 
an approximately normally distributed customer demand with a mean of μ   5  units and a standard 
deviation of σ   2  units. Following Ho et al. (2010), I restrict the demand to positive integer values 
and use the term “approximately normal” instead of “truncated normal” to avoid confusing 
individuals. Information about the demand process was available in the instructions and was explained 
using the empirical rule. In addition, a graph of the demand process was also shown when reading the 
instructions. 
The use of a non-uniform demand follows Su’s (2008) recommendation of studying Newsvendor 
behavioral biases under non-uniform demand distributions (e.g., Ho et al., 2010; Moritz et al., 2013). 
In addition, μ   5  units and σ   2  units assures that the coefficient of variation is large enough to 
make an impact and small enough for a normal distribution to be reasonable (Rudi and Drake, 2011). 
All individuals experienced realizations from the same set of demand values, controlling for the 
impact of demand realizations on inventory ordering decisions. 
For the Newsvendor problem (Arrow et al., 1951), the described parameterization implies optimal 
inventory ordering quantities of 64 units ( 
   
      ) in a high-safety stock condition and 37 units 
( 
    
      ) in a low-safety stock condition. For the Newsvendor problem extension to the case of 
backorders (Bulinskaya, 1964), the described parameterization implies optimal inventory ordering 
quantities of 67 units ( 
   
      ) in a high-safety stock condition and 54 units ( 
    
    5 ) in a low-
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safety stock condition. Notice that  
    
  is not strictly in the domain of a low-safety stock condition 
according to Switcher and Cachon’s (2000) definition since it is larger than μ. However, it serves as a 
reference to explore whether an inventory system with backorders leads to larger inventory ordering 
quantities than an inventory system with lost sales as stated previously. In addition, it is referred as a 
low-safety stock condition for ease of exposition. 
To explore the impact of an inventory system with backorders on inventory ordering behavior, the 
experiment hence considers a 2x2 full factorial between-subjects design. The factors are inventory 
system, viz Newsvendor (lost sales hereafter) and Newsvendor extension to the case of backorders 
(backorders hereafter), and safety stock condition, viz low and high. Notation-wise, Xi, with X Є (   
B), refers to lost sales (L) or backorders (B), where i Є (   H) refers to a low-safety stock (L) or a high-
safety stock (H) condition. For example, LL refers to lost sales low-safety stock items, whereas BH to 
backorders high-safety stock items. Thus, the experiment considers four treatments: 
T1: lost sales low-safety stock item (LL) 
T2: lost sales high-safety stock item (LH) 
T3: backorders low-safety stock item (BL) 
T4: backorder high-safety stock item (BH) 
4.3.2. Experimental procedure 
A total of 96 individuals participated in the experiment. The analysis includes results from 89 
participants. Seven participants were removed from the analysis —5 from BL and 2 from BH— since 
their inventory ordering behaviors suggest that they were not particularly responding to shortages, 
resulting in unusual large backlogs during most of the game
11
. A robustness check to outliers at the 
end of the results section includes results from all participants. All participants were students attending 
a graduate Operations Management course in a Swiss university. The experiment was programmed 
                                                          
11 A non-reported box plot analysis identifies 5 out of 7 of these participants as outliers using the 1.5IQR rule of thumb. A 
subsequent box plot analysis identifies the remaining 2 participants as outliers. 
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and run with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Table 4.1 shows the treatments with their 
corresponding notation and number of participants. 
 
Table 4.1. Treatments, notation, and number of participants. 
 Safety stock condition 
 Low High 
Inventory system 
Lost sales 
T1 (LL) 
22 
T2 (LH) 
22 
Backorders 
T3 (BL) 
24 
T4 (BH) 
21 
 
The experiment was run in two back-to-back sessions. First, lost sales treatments were run in two 
computer rooms, one for LL and the other for LH. Then, backorders treatments were run immediately 
after in the same computer rooms, one for BL and the other for BH. Participants arrived and were given 
the instructions (see Appendix 4.1), which were read aloud by an assistant. Participants had time to 
ask clarifying questions before initiating the experiment. After having read the instructions and 
answered any clarifying questions, the assistant initiated the experiment. Initially, participants were 
asked, though the experiment software, to answer a series of control questions to check they 
understood the instructions. Participants then played five practice rounds to get familiarized with the 
interface and the task. Following, they played the assigned treatment for 30 rounds aiming at 
minimizing cumulative costs. After participants entered their decisions, the system automatically 
revealed the demand realization, the corresponding lost sales (or backorders) or leftovers, and the 
corresponding costs. At any time, participants had access to information about unit purchasing and 
shortage costs c and p, respectively. Participants had also access to all previous decisions and 
outcomes, including demand realizations, lost sales (or backorders), leftovers, costs, and total 
cumulative costs (Appendix 4.2 shows a snapshot of the game screen). After having played the 30 
rounds, participants were asked, though the experiment software, to answer a series of questions about 
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the information cues they were more inclined to use to inform their decisions. Monetary rewards were 
not used to incentivize participants. 
4.4. RESULTS 
4.4.1. Normative hypotheses 
Before showing the formal hypothesis tests, I first show an overview of the average inventory ordering 
behavior for all treatments. Average inventory ordering behavior for a treatment is given by averaging 
average inventory ordering quantities across rounds for each participant across the number of 
participants in the treatment. Figure 4.2 provides 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of the average 
quantities ordered in all treatments
12
. Lost sales results show the typical pull-to-center effect —average 
inventory ordering behavior falls between the expected demand and the optimum— in LH (e.g., Bolton 
et al., 2012; Kremer et al., 2010; Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000) and a strong asymmetry of the pull-
to-center effect —average inventory ordering behavior is above the expected demand— in LL (e.g., 
Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al., 2008; Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000). Backorders results show 
that average inventory ordering behavior in BL is above optimum behavior, whereas it falls between 
the expected demand and the optimum in BH. Comparing both inventory systems in the same safety 
stock condition, backorders appear to induce larger inventory orders than lost sales in both safety stock 
conditions. Following, I present the formal hypothesis tests. 
 
                                                          
12 Non-reported normal Q-Q plots and Shapiro-Wilk tests suggest the four samples follow normal distributions. However, the 
small sample sizes cannot warrant that the samples conform to the assumptions needed to compute standard confidence 
intervals. Hence, I report bootstrap confidence intervals. Non-reported standard confidence intervals show qualitatively the 
same results. 
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Figure 4.2. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of average inventory ordering behaviors. 
 
Building on Bulinskaya’s (1964) Newsvendor problem extension to the case of backorders, I first 
test whether backorders lead to larger inventory ordering quantities than lost sales in the same safety 
stock condition (Hypothesis 1) by comparing population of participants’ average inventory ordering 
quantities. Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests show that average inventory ordering behavior in backorders is 
significantly larger than average inventory ordering behavior in lost sales in the low-safety stock 
condition (W = 426, z = –2.00, p-value1 tail = 0.0227, r = –0.30), whereas highly significantly larger in 
the high-safety stock condition (W = 563.5, z = 2.47, p-value1 tail = 0.0068, r = 0.38)
13
. Hence, there is 
a significant inventory system effect in both safety stock conditions, providing support for Hypothesis 
1. 
I next test whether there is a larger difference in inventory orders between backorders and lost sales 
in low- than in high-safety conditions (Hypothesis 2). This implies testing whether there is a difference 
between the difference between average inventory ordering behavior in BL and LL and the difference 
between average inventory ordering behavior in BH and LH —a difference between the two differences 
examined in Hypothesis 1—, which is essentially an interaction effect (Clogg et al., 1995; Paternoster 
                                                          
13 Non-reported unpaired t-tests show qualitatively the same results for both comparisons. 
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et al., 1998) between inventory system and safety stock condition. I hence estimate the following 
regression model: 
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where the dependent variable  
i̅
 refers to the average inventory ordering quantity across rounds of 
participant i, InvSysti is a dummy for inventory system (0 = lost sales and 1 = backorders), 
SafStockCondi is a dummy for safety stock condition (0 = low- and 1 = high-safety stock condition), 
InvSysti*SafStockCondi captures the interaction between inventory system and safety stock condition, 
and  i is the error term. A significantly negative coefficient for the interaction term 
InvSysti*SafStockCondi will indicate a larger inventory system effect in low- than in high-safety stock 
conditions. Table 4.2 shows the regression results. 
 
Table 4.2. Regression of larger inventory system effect in low-safety stock conditions.
a, b
 
β0 
(Constant) 
β1 
(InvSyst) 
β2 
(SafStockCond) 
β3 
(InvSyst*SafStockCond) 
R
2
 F p-value 
56.53
*
 2.6391† 5.5495
*
 0.8112 0.3636 16.19 0.0000 
(0.9530) (1.3193) (1.3477) (1.8974)    
a Standard errors in parentheses. 
b Significance for coefficients other than the constant is based on 1-tailed p-values. 
* Highly significant, † Significant, ‡ Marginally significant. 
 
Results of Hypothesis 1 suggest there could be a reversed effect from the predicted by Hypothesis 2 
—a larger inventory system effect in high- than in low-safety stock conditions—. Consistent to some 
extent with the results of Hypothesis 1, the coefficient for the interaction term InvSyst*SafStockCond 
is directionally consistent; however, it is a non-significant effect ( 3 = 0.8112, t(85) = 0.43, p-value1 tail 
= 0.3350). Hence, there is no a larger inventory system effect in low- than in high-safety stock 
conditions, providing no support for Hypothesis 2. 
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4.4.2. Behavioral hypotheses 
Before showing the formal hypothesis tests, I first show an overview of the average order adjustment 
behavior after a shortage for all treatments. Average order adjustment behavior after a shortage for a 
treatment is given by averaging average order adjustments after a shortage across shortage cases for 
each participant across the number of participants in the treatment. To compute order adjustments 
after a shortage I check in round t whether there was a shortage case in round t – 1. If there was, I then 
compute and order adjustment as the difference between the order quantities in round t and round t – 
1. For backorders, this could be an imprecise metric to the extent that it does not account for 
backlogged unmet demand in round t – 2 when assessing whether there was a shortage case in round t 
– 1. Hence, for backorders, I account for backlogged unmet demand in round t – 2 when computing 
order adjustments after a shortage. 
Figure 4.3 provides 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of the average order adjustments after a 
shortage in all treatments
14
. Order adjustments after a shortage appear larger in backorders than in lost 
sales regardless of the safety stock condition. Comparing both inventory systems in the same safety 
stock condition, backorders appear to induce larger order adjustments after a shortage than lost sales in 
both safety stock conditions. Following, I present the formal hypothesis tests. 
 
                                                          
14 Non-reported normal Q-Q plots and Shapiro-Wilk tests suggest 2 out of 4 samples do not follow normal distributions. In 
addition, the small sample sizes cannot warrant that the remaining samples conform to the assumptions needed to compute 
standard confidence intervals. Hence, I report bootstrap confidence intervals. Non-reported standard confidence intervals 
show qualitatively the same results. 
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Figure 4.3. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of average order adjustment behaviors after a shortage. 
 
Building on reference dependence-related behavior (Ho et al., 2010), I test whether backorders lead 
to larger order adjustments after a shortage than lost sales in the same safety stock condition 
(Hypothesis 3) by comparing population of participants’ average order adjustments after a shortage. 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests show that order adjustments after a shortage are highly significantly larger 
in backorders than in lost sales in the low-safety stock condition (W = 386, z = –2.88, p-value1 tail = 
0.0020, r = –0.42), whereas marginally significantly larger in the high-safety stock condition (W = 
527, z = 1.58, p-value1 tail = 0.0571, r = 0.24)
15
. Hence, there is a significant inventory system shortage 
effect in the low-safety stock condition only, providing partial support for Hypothesis 3. 
Building on loss aversion-related behavior (Harinck et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2009), I next test 
whether there is a larger difference in order adjustments after a shortage between backorders and lost 
sales in low- than in high-safety conditions (Hypothesis 4). Analogous to Hypothesis 2, this implies 
testing whether there is a difference between two differences, which in this case corresponds to an 
interaction effect (Clogg et al., 1995; Paternoster et al., 1998) between inventory system shortage and 
safety stock condition. I hence estimate a regression model similar to (4.3); the only difference is the 
dependent variable, which now refers to the average order adjustment after a shortage across shortage 
                                                          
15 Non-reported unpaired t-tests show qualitatively the same results for both comparisons. 
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cases of participant i. A significantly negative coefficient for the interaction term 
InvSysti*SafStockCondi will indicate a larger inventory system shortage effect in low- than in high-
safety stock conditions. Table 4.3 shows the regression results. 
 
Table 4.3. Regression of larger inventory system shortage effect in low-safety stock conditions.
a, b
 
β0 
(Constant) 
β1 
(InvSyst) 
β2 
(SafStockCond) 
β3 
(InvSyst*SafStockCond) 
R
2
 F p-value 
6.14
*
 5.4864
*
 2.7673‡ -2.1108 0.1234 3.99 0.0104 
(1.4077) (1.9489) (1.9908) (2.8029)    
a Standard errors in parentheses. 
b Significance for coefficients other than the constant is based on 1-tailed p-values. 
* Highly significant, † Significant, ‡ Marginally significant. 
 
Results of Hypothesis 3 suggest there could be an effect consistent with the one predicted by 
Hypothesis 4. Consistent to some extent with the results of Hypothesis 3, the coefficient for the 
interaction term InvSyst*SafStockCond is directionally consistent; however, it is a non-significant 
effect ( 3 = –2.1108, t(85) = –0.75, p-value1 tail = 0.2267). Hence, there is no a significantly larger 
inventory system shortage effect in low- than in high-safety stock conditions, providing no support for 
Hypothesis 4. 
Finally, following misperceptions of feedback (e.g., Croson and Donohue, 2006; Steckel et al., 
2004; Sterman, 1989; Wu and Katok, 2006), I test whether individuals adjust inventory ordering 
quantities insufficiently to backorders (Hypothesis 5). Building on Bloomfield and Kulp’s (2013) 
misperceptions of feedback test, I estimate the following fix-effects panel regression model for each 
treatment: 
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where qi, t refers to the inventory ordering decision of participant i in period t, Shortagei, t – 1 
captures the amount of lost sales (or backorders) of participant i in period t – 1, Leftoversi, t – 1 captures 
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the amount of leftovers of participant i in period t – 1, vi is the participants’ effect, and  i, t is the error 
term. The model allows identifying whether participants are insufficiently adjusting to lost sales (or 
backorders) and leftovers. Notice that optimal inventory ordering behavior would result in (i)  0 
having values of 37 and 64 for LL and LH, respectively, whereas values of 54 and 67 for BL and BH, 
respectively; (ii)  1 having values of 0 and 1 in lost sales and backorders, respectively; and (iii)  2 
being 0 in both lost sales and backorders (see highlighted values in Table 4.4). That is, in lost sales 
participants should not adjust inventory ordering quantities neither to shortages nor to leftovers, 
whereas in backorders they should adjust inventory ordering quantities to shortages only. Table 4.4 
shows the regression results. 
 
Table 4.4. Fixed-effects panel regression of misperceptions of feedback.
a
 
 LL BL LH BH 
β0 
(Constant) 
56.42
*
 37 56.01
*
 54 60.99
*
 64 63.31
*
 67 
(0.6487)  (0.9729)  (0.7811)  (0.7565)  
β1 
(Shortage) 
0.1254
*
 0 0.3758
*
 1 0.2326
*
 0 0.5368
*
 1 
(0.0362)  (0.0333)  (0.0539)  (0.0486)  
β2 
(Leftovers) 
-0.0645
*
 0 -0.2616
*
 0 -0.0014 0 -0.0618† 0 
(0.0243)  (0.0440)  (0.0263)  (0.0269)  
R
2 0.3217  0.3101  0.2191  0.2945  
F 19.56  137.88  12.41  95.44  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
a Standard errors in parentheses. 
* Highly significant, † Significant, ‡ Marginally significant. 
 
Consistent with misperceptions of feedback, participants under react to shortages in BL. 
Specifically, each unit in the backlog changes inventory ordering quantities by 0.3758 units. The 
effect, although highly significant (t(670) = 11.27, p-value2 tails =0.0000), is below the optimal reaction 
(t(670) = –18.72, p-value1 tail = 0.0000). A qualitatively similar result is observed in BH. Specifically, 
each unit in the backlog changes inventory ordering quantities by 0.5368 units. The effect, although 
highly significant (t(586) = 11.04, p-value2 tails = 0.0000), is also below the optimal reaction (t(586) = 
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–9.53, p-value1 tail = 0.0000). In addition, results show that participants react to shortages in both LL ( 1 
= 0.1254, t(614) = 3.47, p-value2 tails =0.0006) and LH ( 1 = 0.2326, t(614) = 4.31, p-value2 tails 
=0.0000) despite the fact that shortages should not affect inventory ordering behavior when unmet 
demand is lost, which is consistent with results reported in Bloomfield and Kulp (2013). Hence, there 
is a significant underweighting of backorders in both backorders cases, providing support for 
Hypothesis 5. 
4.4.3. Robustness check to outliers 
As mentioned previously, 7 participants were removed from the analysis since their inventory ordering 
behaviors resulted in unusual large backlogs during most of the game, suggesting that they did not 
fully understand the implications of backlogging unmet demand. Here I repeat the hypothesis tests 
including the removed participants as a robustness check. 
For Hypothesis 1 (inventory system effect in the same safety stock condition), results go from 
significant to non-significant between BL and LL, whereas from highly significant to significant 
between BH and LH. By including outliers, average inventory ordering behavior is driven downwards 
in both backorders cases, reducing the average difference between lost sales and backorders in the 
same safety stock condition. For Hypothesis 2 (larger inventory system effect in low- than in high-
safety stock conditions), the magnitude of the effect remains reversed and increases from 0.8112 to 
2.1201. By including outliers, average inventory ordering behavior seems to be more affected in BL 
than in BH, leading to the observed increased reversed effect. However, the effect remains non-
significant. 
For Hypothesis 3 (inventory system shortage effect in the same safety stock condition), results go 
from highly significant to significant between BL and LL, whereas from marginally significant to non-
significant between BH and LH. By including outliers, average order adjustments after a shortage are 
driven downwards in both backorders cases, reducing the average difference between lost sales and 
backorders in the same safety stock condition. For Hypothesis 4 (larger inventory system shortage 
effect in low- than in high-safety stock conditions), the magnitude of the effect reduces from –2.1108 
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to –1.1496. By including outliers, order adjustments after a shortage seem to be more affected in BL 
than in BH, leading to the observed reduced effect. In addition, the effect remains non-significant. 
Finally, for Hypothesis 5 (underweighting of backorders), an underweighting of backorders 
remains highly significant in both safety stock conditions, but the magnitude of the effect is reduced 
from 0.5368 to 0.2570 in BH, whereas from 0.3758 to 0.1251 in BL. By including outliers, reaction to 
shortages is affected in both backorders cases, reducing the impact of prior shortages on inventory 
ordering behavior. 
Summarizing, a robustness check to outliers suggests that the hypotheses most affected by outliers 
in terms of whether they are supported are Hypotheses 1 and 3 since one comparison in the former 
downgrades from significance to non-significance, whereas one in the latter downgrades from 
marginally significance to non-significance. Thus, Hypothesis 1 downgrades to partially supported, 
whereas Hypothesis 3 remains partially supported. Hence, the reported results are fairly robust to 
outliers. 
4.5. DISCUSSION 
I presented an experimental comparison of the traditional Newsvendor problem to its extension to the 
case of backorders in order to assess the effect of backorders on inventory ordering behavior more 
accurately and assess whether suppliers realize the benefits of an inventory system with backorders. 
Specifically, I compared differences in inventory ordering behaviors and in order adjustments after a 
shortage, and analyzed the extent to which participants underweight backorders. 
Comparisons of inventory ordering behaviors reveals there is an inventory system effect in both 
safety stock conditions (H1), showing consistency with normative arguments developed based on a 
comparison of the optimality structures of both inventory systems (Arrow et al., 1951; Bulinskaya, 
1964). However, the analysis reveals there is no a larger different inventory system effect in low- than 
in high-safety stock conditions (H2), showing no consistency with additional normative arguments 
developed based on the referred inventory systems comparison. To assess more clearly the impact of 
backorders with respect to lost sales, I further compare the average distance to the optimal inventory 
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ordering quantity between BL and LL and between BH and LH. In low-safety stock conditions, 
participants are highly significantly closer to the optimum in backorders than in lost sales (W = 663, z 
= 3.21, p-value1 tail = 0.0007, r = 0.47), whereas we cannot statistically rule out the possibility that the 
average distance to the optimal inventory ordering quantity between BH and LH is similar (W = 482.5, z 
= 0.50, p-value1 tail = 0.3092, r = 0.08). In addition, following the same approach of Hypotheses 2 and 
4, the effect is found to be significantly larger in low- than in high-safety stock conditions ( 3 = 
6.0741, t(85) = 1.97, p-value1 tail = 0.0261). 
These results show that an inventory system with backorders is more beneficial than an inventory 
system with lost sales for low-safety stock items, suggesting that suppliers should prefer backorders 
over lost sales for costly or low-profit products. Although results do not show that an inventory system 
with backorders is more beneficial than an inventory system with lost sales for high-safety stock items, 
the former did lead to larger inventory ordering quantities than the latter. This result suggests that 
suppliers should prefer backorders over lost sales for cheap or high-profit products with high customer 
service expectations. Overall, the previous results suggest that suppliers may run higher performing 
businesses in terms of profits and/or customer service satisfaction by backlogging unmet demand 
instead of losing sales. 
Comparison of order adjustments after a shortage reveals there is an inventory system shortage 
effect in low-safety stock conditions, whereas the effect is marginal in high-safety stock conditions 
(H3). Such results are consistent with reference dependence-related arguments, more specifically with 
salient disutilities (Ho et al., 2010). Although there is a larger different inventory system shortage 
effect in low- than in high-safety stock conditions consistent with loss aversion-related arguments 
(Harinck et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2009), the analysis reveals the effect is not significant (H4). The 
previous results suggest that participants do adjust inventory ordering quantities to backorders. 
However, their inventory ordering quantities do not fully account for backorders as suggested by the 
underweighting of backorders observed in both BL and BH (H5). Such results are consistent with 
misperceptions of feedback-related arguments (e.g., Bloomfield and Kulp, 2013; Croson and 
Donohue, 2006; Sterman, 1989). 
86 
These results show that more salient shortages (backorders) influence inventory ordering behavior 
to a greater extent than less salient shortages (lost sales). Nevertheless, less salient shortages do 
influence inventory ordering behavior as shown by the misperceptions of feedback test. Although from 
a normative perspective backorders can be though as the opposite of lost sales regarding the way 
unmet demand is handled, the previous results show that from a behaviorally perspective they are 
related. In particular, and following the same line of reasoning of Ho et al. (2013), backorders do not 
eliminate the behavioral effect of lost sales but increase it in order to influence inventory ordering 
behavior in an intended direction. Although backorders do influence behavior in the intended 
direction, misperceptions of feedback show there is room for improvement even in the relatively 
simple inventory setting portrayed in this study. 
Notwithstanding its contributions, the study has a number of limitations that future research could 
address. First, the experiment assumed full backlogging. In reality, customers may choose whether to 
place backorders (e.g., Lee and Lodree Jr., 2010; Lodree Jr., 2007). Hence, future work could study 
partial backlogging and assess its effect on inventory ordering behavior. Second, the experiment 
assumed no customer incentives to place backorders. Although this study shows that suppliers may 
realize the benefits of an inventory system with backorders, customers may not be willing to place 
backorders unless incentives are offered to them (e.g., Cheung, 1998; DeCroix and Arreola-Risa, 
1998; Netessine et al., 2006). Hence, future work could study the supplier’s option of offering 
incentives to customers to place backorders and assess behaviorally its effect on inventory ordering 
behavior. Third, the backorder cost was assumed to be charged per unit per unit time following 
Bulinskaya’s (1964) model. Backorder costs can also be time-independent, a fixed penalty, or a mix of 
them (e.g., Çetinkaya and Parlar, 1998; Ray et al., 2010). Hence, future work could manipulate the 
way backorders costs are charged in order to assess behaviorally which cost structure is more 
beneficial for suppliers. Fourth, the experiment had no revenue metric and hence asked participants to 
minimize costs. Hence, future research could explore how the proposed framework influences 
inventory ordering decisions in a more traditional profit-based Newsvendor experiment. Finally, 
monetary rewards were not used to incentivize participants. On the one hand, it could be argued that 
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monetary rewards would improve results. On the other hand, the fact that backorders effects were 
observed may cast doubt on this observation. Nevertheless, future research could use monetary 
rewards for the sake of experimental rigor and analyze whether the use of incentives affects the 
observed effects. 
In summary, in this study I tested behaviorally the Newsvendor problem extension to the case of 
backorders (Bulinskaya, 1964). I offered normative as well as behavioral arguments to explain the 
observed behavior and showed the benefits that suppliers may realize by backlogging unmet demand, 
contributing thus to the literatures on Behavioral Operations Management and incentives to 
backorders. I hope this study can prompt further interest in behavioral tests of different backlogging 
mechanisms and the response of both supplier s and customers to them. 
 
Appendix 4.1. Sample of written instructions (BH) 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions in inventory management. From 
now until the end of the session, you are not allowed to talk with one another. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
Your goal is to minimize the costs you accumulate over 30 rounds of play. 
 
TASK 
You are a retailer who orders a single product or item from a supplier. In each decision round, you 
have to place Orders for items to satisfy an uncertain customer Demand. 
 
COSTS 
You order items from a supplier at a purchasing cost of 1 experimental francs (e$) per item. 
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If Order < Demand, you incur a backorder cost of e$ 4 per unit short of demand. Units short of 
demand carry over or accumulate as Backorders (equivalent to having negative inventory). Hence, 
they do affect following rounds. That is, if Backorders > 0, your next Order will: 
 
1. Be directed automatically to meet Backorders. 
2. The remaining items will meet Demand for the round. If the remaining items are not enough 
to meet Demand, a (updated) backorder situation remains and you incur backorder costs 
accordingly. 
 
For example, if Backorders = 10, Order = 40, and Demand = 60, then Order meets Backorders, but 
the remaining items do not meet Demand, resulting in 30 Backorders. 
 Purchasing cost = 1 x 40 = e$ 40, 
 Backorder cost = 4 x 30 = e$ 120, 
 Total cost = 40 + 120 = e$ 160. 
 
Alternatively, if Backorders = 10, Order = 60, and Demand = 40, then Order meets Backorders, 
and the remaining items do meet Demand, resulting in an excess of 10 units that are discarded at no 
cost. 
 Purchasing cost = 1 x 60 = e$ 60, 
 Backorder cost = 4 x 0 = e$ 0, 
 Total cost = 60 + 0 = e$ 60. 
 
If Order ≥ Demand, you discard the excess units at no cost. However, you will have incurred 
unnecessary purchasing costs for the excess units, yet excess units do not carry over or accumulate as 
inventory. Hence, they do not affect following rounds. 
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DEMAND 
In each round, your ordering decision is made before you know with certainty what quantity of items 
your customers will demand. However, you know that demand is approximately normally distributed 
with mean 50 and standard deviation 20, i.e. 68% of the values lie between 50 – 20 and 50 + 20 (30, 
70), 95% of the values lie between 50 – 40 and 50 + 40 (10, 90) and approximately 100% of the values 
lie between 50 – 50 and 50 + 60 (0, 110). In addition, demand is independent in each round, i.e. a 
small or large demand in earlier rounds has no influence on whether demand is small or large in later 
rounds. 
 
Once you place your order, the computer selects the customer demand following the described demand 
distribution. You will receive demand and performance results for the round and history of play to 
date. The computer does not advance to the next decision round until all players are done with the 
current one. 
 
[Page change] 
 
Name: ______________________________ 
 
Please write down the Orders you place in each round in the following table: 
 
[Decision table] 
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Appendix 4.2. Sample of game screen (BH) 
 
 
Figure A4.2.1. Sample of game screen. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation presented the application of laboratory experiments to study biased Newsvendor 
ordering behavior. It contributes to the literature on Behavioral Operations Management (Bendoly et 
al., 2006; Bendoly et al., 2010; Gino and Pisano, 2008; Loch and Wu, 2007) by exploring the 
application of the Newsvendor model to a structurally similar decision making context, applying a 
well-known psychological theory as a debiasing mechanism for biased Newsvendor ordering behavior, 
and testing behaviorally a Newsvendor extension to the case of backorders. A discussion of each of 
these points is presented below, followed by a discussion of the limitations of the dissertation and 
opportunities for future research. 
5.1. CONTRIBUTIONS 
The first essay showed the application of the Newsvendor model to complexity level and resource 
allocation decisions in NPD projects under innovation uncertainty. It contributes to the analytical 
literature on NPD and innovation by presenting the Innovator model, a simple yet informative decision 
making model that can inform complexity level and resource allocation decisions in a simplified 
innovation pipeline, addressing thus the complex nature of previous analytical models (e.g., Loch and 
Terwiesch, 2005; Pich et al., 2002). Moreover, it contributes to the Behavioral Operations 
Management literature by shedding light on the potential decision making biases NPD managers may 
be prone to. Building on insights from previous Newsvendor experiments and the results observed in 
the behavioral test of the Innovator model, this essay suggests that NPD managers may poorly 
understand decision making under innovation uncertainty. Consequently, they may underperform in 
demanding markets and over perform in less challenging ones, reducing their chances of bringing 
successful products to the market place. 
Building on Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory, the second essay showed how 
dissonant and consonant states may be elicited in a Newsvendor setting to influence inventory 
ordering decisions in intended directions. It contributes to the Behavioral Operations Management 
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literature by applying Festinger’s (1957) and Simon et al.’s (1995) cognitive dissonance and 
dissonance reduction arguments, respectively, as the foundation of a debiasing mechanism that pairs 
items’ importance and safety stock condition in joint Newsvendor ordering decisions to debias or 
strengthen biased inventory ordering behavior for critical items. Building on the behavioral test of the 
debiasing mechanism, this essay suggests that consonant Newsvendor settings may help Newsvendors 
achieving higher profits and product availability for critical items, whereas dissonant Newsvendor 
settings may help Newsvendors achieving higher product availability for critical items. 
Finally, the third essay tested behaviorally Bulinskaya’s (1964) Newsvendor extension to the case 
of backorders, comparing it to the traditional lost sales Newsvendor model. It contributes to the 
Behavioral Operations Management literature by comparing both models theoretically and also 
behaviorally building on reference dependence (Ho et al., 2010), loss aversion (Harinck et al., 2007; 
Smith et al., 2009), and misperceptions of feedback (e.g., Bloomfield and Kulp, 2013; Croson and 
Donohue, 2006; Sterman, 1989) arguments. Moreover, it also contributes to the literature on 
incentives to backorders by showing that backorders induce better inventory ordering behavior 
compared to lost sales. Building on the experimental comparison of both models, this essay suggests 
that suppliers may benefit in terms of both profits and product availability by backlogging unmet 
demand instead of losing sales for costly items, whereas in terms of product availability for cheap 
items. 
5.2. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Lab experiments offer the advantage of a tight control of confounding factors, allowing establishing 
cause-and-effect relationships. However, this comes at the expense of external validity. Accordingly, 
limitations of this dissertation go hand in hand with external validity concerns. 
In the first essay we assumed a single stage-gate innovation pipeline under a single uncertainty 
source and built the Innovator model under this simplifying assumption. The Innovator model is 
intended to be a foundational model to inform decision making in NPD projects. However, we 
recognize that innovation pipelines are more complex since they typically comprise more than one 
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development stage and have several uncertainty sources affecting each screening process 
simultaneously (Cooper et al., 1998). Hence, future work could add more than one development stage, 
more than one uncertainty source, and more than one decision, separately and jointly, to assess how 
increasing complexity levels of the innovation pipeline affect managerial performance. This will 
certainly complicate the tractability of the model, but has also the potential of offering more 
managerial insights to NPD managers. 
In the second essay we assumed an unconstrained Newsstand (multi-item Newsvendor) setting to 
run a clean test of the proposed debiasing mechanism. Newsstand settings recognize that many times 
managers have to conduct a balancing act between how much to order from several competing 
products and their available resources (Abdel-Malek and Montanari, 2005). Accordingly, the 
Newsstand formulation comprises resource constraints. Hence, future work could add resource 
constraints (e.g., budget, storage capacity) and assess how these affect inventory ordering behavior in 
both consonant and dissonant decision frameworks. 
We also assumed in the second essay that cognitive dissonance is the underlying psychological 
mechanism through which individuals change their inventory ordering decisions in joint decision 
frameworks. However, we lack an out-of-task measure of cognitive dissonance. Despite the control of 
confounding factors, it is difficult to determine if cognitive dissonance is the only psychological 
mechanism at work in our joint decision framework. Hence, future work could use an out-of-task 
measure of cognitive dissonance adapted to the particular case of our joint decision framework and test 
whether the measure explains the observed behavior (e.g., Moritz, 2010). 
In the third essay we showed how backlogging unmet demand instead of losing sales is beneficial 
for suppliers. However, we did not consider the case of offering customer incentives to place 
backorders, which is usually how a backorders system is implemented in practice (e.g., Cheung, 1998; 
DeCroix and Arreola-Risa, 1998; Netessine et al., 2006). Hence, future work could study how the 
option of offering customer incentives to place backorders affect inventory ordering behavior. In 
addition, in this essay as well as in the second one we assumed a cost-based inventory framework, i.e., 
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there was no revenue metric. Hence, future work could test both frameworks in more traditional profit-
based Newsvendor experiments. 
Finally, monetary rewards were not used to incentivize participants. Although the protocols of 
Experimental Economics call for monetary rewards to incentivize participants (Smith, 1976, 1982), 
there is no systematic evidence showing that offering monetary rewards to incentivize participants 
leads to better performance (Arkes, 1991; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). Given the social nature of the 
decision making task in the second essay —inventory prepositioning in preparation to emergency 
response— and the pool of participants —humanitarian practitioners—, it is unclear whether monetary 
rewards could have led to qualitatively different results. What it is clear is that results were consistent 
with the hypothesized effects, especially in the dissonant decision making framework. Although in the 
first essay we applied the Newsvendor framework to a new context, the context is structurally 
equivalent to the one portrayed in typical Newsvendor experiments. Moreover, results resembled those 
observed in previous Newsvendor experiments. The same holds in the third essay, in which lost sales 
results resembled those observed in previous Newsvendor experiments, whereas backorders results 
were qualitatively consistent with previous inventory management experiments that have found that 
backorders are underweighted. Hence, it does not seem safe to argue that monetary rewards would 
have led to qualitatively different results. However, in the spirit of experimental rigor, monetary 
rewards to incentivize participants should be used in extensions of this dissertation, especially in cases 
in which the decision framework has not been explored behaviorally before. 
 
 
 
 
95 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abdel-Malek, L. L., Areeratchakul, N. 2007. A Quadratic Programming Approach to the Multi-
Product Newsvendor Problem with Side Constraints. European Journal of Operational Research, 
176(3): 1607-1619. 
Abdel-Malek, L. L., Montanari, R. 2005. On the Multi-Product Newsboy Problem with Two 
Constraints. Computers & Operations Research, 32(8): 2095-2116. 
Anupindi, R., Akella, R. 1993. Diversification under Supply Uncertainty. Management Science, 39(8): 
944-963. 
Arkes, H. 1991. Cost and Benefits of Judgment Errors: Implications for Debiasing. Psychological 
Bulletin, 110(3): 486-498. 
Arrow, K. J., Harris, T., Marschak, J. 1951. Optimal Inventory Policy. Econometrica, 19(3): 250-272. 
Balcik, B., Beamon, B. M. 2008. Facility Location in Humanitarian Relief. International Journal of 
Logistics: Research and Applications, 11(2): 101-121. 
Beamon, B. M., Kotleba, S. A. 2006. Inventory Modelling for Complex Emergencies in Humanitarian 
Relief Operations. International Journal of Logistics: Research and Applications, 9(1): 1-18. 
Beinhocker, E. D. 1999. Robust Adaptive Strategies. Sloan Management Review, 40(3): 95-106. 
Bellera, C. A., Julien, M., Hanley, J. A. 2010. Normal Approximations to the Distributions of the 
Wilcoxon Statistics: Accurate to What N? Graphical Insights. Journal of Statistics Education, 
18(2): 17 pp. 
Bendoly, E., Croson, R., Gonçalves, P., Schultz, K. L. 2010. Bodies of Knowledge for Research in 
Behavioral Operations. Production and Operations Management, 19(4): 434-452. 
Bendoly, E., Donohue, K. L., Schultz, K. L. 2006. Behavior in Operations Management: Assessing 
Recent Findings and Revisiting Old Assumptions. Journal of Operations Management, 24(6): 737-
752. 
Benzion, U., Cohen, Y., Peled, R., Shavit, T. 2008. Decision-Making and the Newsvendor Problem: 
An Experimental Study. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 59(9): 1281-1287. 
96 
Benzion, U., Cohen, Y., Shavit, T. 2010. The Newsvendor Problem with Unknown Distribution. 
Journal of the Operational Research Society, 61(6): 1022-1031. 
Bloomfield, R. J., Kulp, S. L. 2013. Durability, Transit Lags and Optimality of Inventory Management 
Decisions. Production and Operations Management, in press. 
Bolton, G. E., Katok, E. 2008. Learning by Doing in the Newsvendor Problem: A Laboratory 
Investigation of the Role of Experience and Feedback. Manufacturing & Service Operations 
Management, 10(3): 519-538. 
Bolton, G. E., Ockenfels, A., Thonemann, U. W. 2012. Managers and Students as Newsvendors. 
Management Science, 58(12): 2225-2233. 
Bostian, A. A., Holt, C. A., Smith, A. M. 2008. Newsvendor “Pull-to-Center” Effect: Adaptive 
Learning in a Laboratory Experiment. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 10(4): 
590-608. 
Bulinskaya, E. V. 1964. Some Results Concerning Optimum Inventory Policies. Theory of Probability 
and Its Applications, 9(3): 389-403. 
Cachon, G. P., Terwiesch, C. 2009. Matching Supply with Demand: An Introduction to Operations 
Management. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
Camerer, C. F., Hogarth, R. M. 1999. The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review 
and Capital-Labor Production Framework. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19(1-3): 7-42. 
Cantor, D. E., Katok, E. 2012. Production Smoothing in a Serial Supply Chain: A Laboratory 
Investigation. Transportation Research Part E, 48(4): 781-794. 
Çetinkaya, S., Parlar, M. 1998. Optimal Myopic Policy for a Stochastic Inventory Problem with Fixed 
and Proportional Backorder Costs. European Journal of Operational Research, 110(1): 20-41. 
Chen, L., Kök, A. G., Tong, J. D. 2013. The Effect of Payment Schemes on Inventory Decisions: The 
Role of Mental Accounting. Management Science, 59(2): 436-451. 
Cheung, K. L. 1998. A Continuous Review Inventory Model with a Time Discount. IIE Transactions, 
30(8): 747-757. 
97 
Clogg, C. C., Petkova, E., Haritou, A. 1995. Statistical Methods for Comparing Regression 
Coefficients between Models. American Journal of Sociology, 100(5): 1261-1293. 
Cohen, J. 1988. Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
----- 1990. Things I Have Learned (So Far). American Psychologist, 45(12): 1304-1312. 
Cooper, L. P. 2003. A Research Agenda to Reduce Risk in New Product Development through 
Knowledge Management: A Practitioner Perspective. Journal of Engineering and Technology 
Management, 20(1-2): 117-140. 
Cooper, R. G., Edgett, S. J., Kleinschmidt, E. J. 1998. Portfolio Management for New Products. 
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Croson, R., Donohue, K. L. 2003. Impact of POS Data Sharing on Supply Chain Management: An 
Experimental Study. Production and Operations Management, 12(1): 1-11. 
----- 2005. Upstream versus Downstream Information and Its Impacts on the Bullwhip Effect. System 
Dynamics Review, 21(3): 249-260. 
----- 2006. Behavioral Causes of the Bullwhip Effect and the Observed Value of Inventory 
Information. Management Science, 52(3): 323-336. 
Croson, R., Donohue, K. L., Katok, E., Sterman, J. D. 2013. Order Stability in Supply Chains: 
Coordination Risk and the Role of Coordination Stock. Production and Operations Management, 
in press. 
Cui, Y., Chen, L. G., Chen, J., Gavirneni, S., Wang, Q. 2013. Chinese Perspective on Newsvendor 
Bias: An Exploratory Note. Journal of Operations Management, 31(1-2): 93-97. 
de Véricourt, F., Jain, K., Bearden, J. N., Filipowicz, A. 2013. Sex, Risk and the Newsvendor. Journal 
of Operations Management, 31(1-2): 86-92. 
DeCroix, G. A., Arreola-Risa, A. 1998. On Offering Economic Incentives to Backorder. IIE 
Transactions, 30(8): 715-721. 
Edgeworth, F. Y. 1888. The Mathematical Theory of Banking. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
51(1): 113-127. 
98 
Efron, B., Tibshirani, R. 1986. Bootstrap Methods for Standard Errors, Confidence Intervals, and 
Other Measures of Statistical Accuracy. Statistical Science, 1(1): 54-75. 
Feng, T., Keller, L. R., Zheng, X. 2011. Decision Making in the Newsvendor Problem: A Cross-
National Laboratory Study. Omega, 39(1): 41-50. 
Festinger, L. 1957. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Field, A. 2009. Discovering Statistics Using SPSS. London: Sage. 
Fischbacher, U. 2007. z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-Made Economic Experiments. Experimental 
Economics, 10(2): 171-178. 
Gallego, G., Moon, I. 1993. The Distribution Free Newsboy Problem: Review and Extensions. Journal 
of the Operational Research Society, 44(8): 825-834. 
Gaur, V., Park, Y.-H. 2007. Asymmetric Consumer Learning and Inventory Competition. 
Management Science, 53(2): 227-240. 
Gavirneni, S., Isen, A. M. 2010. Anatomy of a Newsvendor Decision: Observations from a Verbal 
Protocol Analysis. Production and Operations Management, 19(4): 453-462. 
Gino, F., Pisano, G. 2008. Toward a Theory of Behavioral Operations. Manufacturing & Service 
Operations Management, 10(4): 676-691. 
Griffin, A. 1997. The Effect of Project and Process Characteristics on Product Development Cycle 
Time. Journal of Marketing Research, 34(1): 24-35. 
Harinck, F., Van Dijk, E., Van Beest, I., Mersmann, P. 2007. When Gains Loom Larger than Losses: 
Reversed Loss Aversion for Small Amounts of Money. Psychological Science, 18(12): 1099-1105. 
Harmon-Jones, E., Harmon-Jones, C. 2007. Cognitive Dissonance Theory After 50 Years of 
Development. Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie, 38(1): 7-16. 
Ho, T.-H., Lim, N., Cui, T.-H. 2010. Reference Dependence in Multilocation Newsvendor Models: A 
Structural Analysis. Management Science, 56(11): 1891-1910. 
Hobday, M. 1998. Product Complexity, Innovation and Industrial Organisation. Research Policy, 
26(6): 689-710. 
99 
Jauch, L. R., Kraft, K. L. 1986. Strategic Management of Uncertainty. Academy of Management 
Review, 11(4): 777-790. 
Kahneman, D. 2003. A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality. 
American Psychologist, 58(9): 697-720. 
Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. 1979. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. 
Econometrica, 47(2): 263-291. 
Katok, E. 2011. Laboratory Experiments in Operations Management. In Geunes, J. P. (Ed.), Tutorials 
in Operations Research. Hanover, MD: INFORMS, pp. 15-35. 
Khouja, M. 1996. A Note on the Newsboy Problem with an Emergency Supply Option. Journal of the 
Operational Research Society, 47(12): 1530-1534. 
----- 1999. The Single-Period (News-Vendor) Problem: Literature Review and Suggestions for Future 
Research. Omega, 27(5): 537-553. 
Kim, J., Wilemon, D. 2003. Sources and Assessment of Complexity in NPD Projects. R&D 
Management, 33(1): 15-30. 
Kremer, M., Minner, S., van Wassenhove, L. N. 2010. Do Random Errors Explain Newsvendor 
Behavior? Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 12(4): 673-681. 
Krishnan, V., Ulrich, K. T. 2001. Product Development Decisions: A Review of the Literature. 
Management Science, 47(1): 1-21. 
Lau, H.-S., Lau, A. H.-L. 1995. The Multi-Product Multi-Constraint Newsboy Problem: Applications, 
Formulation and Solution. Journal of Operations Management, 13(2): 153-162. 
----- 1996. The Newsstand Problem: A Capacitated Multiple-Product Single-Period Inventory 
Problem. European Journal of Operational Research, 94(1): 29-42. 
Lee, H., Lodree Jr., E. J. 2010. Modeling Customer Impatience in a Newsboy Problem with Time-
Sensitive Shortages. European Journal of Operational Research, 205(3): 595-603. 
Liu, L., Shang, W., Wu, S. 2007. Dynamic Competitive Newsvendors with Service-Sensitive 
Demands. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 9(1): 84-93. 
100 
Loch, C. H., Terwiesch, C. 2005. Rush and Be Wrong or Wait and Be Late? A Model of Information 
in Collaborative Processes. Production and Operations Management, 14(3): 331-343. 
Loch, C. H., Wu, Y. 2007. Behavioral Operations Management. Foundations and Trends in 
Technology, Information and Operations Management, 1(3): 121-232. 
Lodree Jr., E. J. 2007. Advanced Supply Chain Planning with Mixtures of Backorders, Lost Sales, and 
Lost Contract. European Journal of Operational Research, 181(1): 168-183. 
Lodree Jr., E. J., Kim, Y., Jang, W. 2008. Time and Quantity Dependent Waiting Costs in a 
Newsvendor Problem with Backlogged Shortages. Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 47(1-
2): 60-71. 
Lodree Jr., E. J., Taskin, S. 2008. An Insurance Risk Management Framework for Disaster Relief and 
Supply Chain Disruption Inventory Planning. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 59(5): 
674-684. 
Lurie, N. H., Swaminathan, J. M. 2009. Is Timely Information Always Better? The Effect of Feedback 
Frequency on Decision Making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 108(2): 
315-329. 
Lynn, G. S., Morone, J. G., Paulson, A. S. 1996. Marketing and Discontinous Innovation: The Probe-
and-Learn Process. California Management Review, 38(3): 8-36. 
McCarthy, I. P., Tsinopoulos, C., Allen, P., Rose-Andersen, C. 2006. New Product Development as a 
Complex Adaptive System of Decisions. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 23(5): 437-
456. 
Milkman, K. L., Rogers, T., Bazerman, M. H. 2008. Harnessing Our Inner Angels and Demons: What 
We Have Learned About Want/Should Conflicts and How That Knowledge Can Help Us Reduce 
Short-Sighted Decision Making. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3(4): 324-338. 
Moenaert, R. K., Souder, W. E. 1990. An Information Transfer Model for Integrating Marketing and 
R&D Personnel in New Product Development Projects. Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, 7(2): 91-107. 
101 
Moritz, B. B. 2010. Cognition and Heterogeneity in Supply Chain Planning: A Study of Inventory 
Decision Making. Ph.D. Dissertation, The Graduate School, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 
MN. 
Moritz, B. B., Hill, A. V., Donohue, K. L. 2013. Individual Differences in the Newsvendor Problem: 
Behavior and Cognitive Reflection. Journal of Operations Management, 31(1-2): 72-85. 
Mullins, J. W., Sutherland, D. J. 1998. New Product Development in Rapidly Changing Markets: An 
Exploratory Study. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 15(3): 224-236. 
Murmann, P. A. 1994. Expected Development Time Reductions in the German Mechanical 
Engineering Industry. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 11(3): 236-252. 
Netessine, S., Rudi, N., Wang, Y. 2006. Inventory competition and incentives to back-order. IIE 
Transactions, 38(11): 883-902. 
Osterloh, M., Frey, B. S. 2002. Does Pay for Performance Really Motivate Employees? In Neely, A. 
(Ed.), Business Performance Measurement: Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 107-122. 
Paternoster, R., Brame, R., Mazerolle, P., Piquero, A. 1998. Using the Correct Statistical Test for the 
Equality of Regression Coefficients. Criminology, 36(4): 859-866. 
Perry, J. L., Mesch, D., Paalberg, L. 2006. Motivating Employees in a New Governance Era: The 
Performance Paradigm Revisited. Public Administration Review, 66(4): 505-514. 
Pich, M. T., Loch, C. H., De Meyer, A. 2002. On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Complexity in Project 
Management. Management Science, 48(8): 1008-1023. 
Rawls, C. G., Turnquist, M. A. 2010. Pre-Positioning of Emergency Supplies for Disaster Response. 
Transportation Research Part B, 44(4): 521-534. 
Ray, S., Song, Y., Verma, M. 2010. Comparison of Two Periodic Review Models for Stochastic and 
Price-Sensitive Demand Environment. International Journal of Production Economics, 128(1): 
209-222. 
Read, D., Loewenstein, G., Rabin, M. 1999. Choice Bracketing. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 
19(1-3): 171-197. 
102 
Rudi, N., Drake, D. 2011. Observation Bias: The Impact of Demand Censoring on Newsvendor Level 
and Adjustment Behavior. Working Paper No. 12-042, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA. 
Schrader, S., Riggs, W. M., Smith, R. P. 1993. Choice over Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Technical 
Problem Solving. Journal of Engineering and Technology Management, 10(1-2): 73-99. 
Schweitzer, M. E., Cachon, G. P. 2000. Decision Bias in the Newsvendor Problem with a Known 
Demand Distribution: Experimental Evidence. Management Science, 46(3): 404-420. 
Simon, L., Greenberg, J., Brehm, J. 1995. Trivialization: The Forgotten Mode of Dissonance 
Reduction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68(2): 247-260. 
Smith, G., Levere, M., Kurtzman, R. 2009. Poker Player Behavior After Big Wins and Big Losses. 
Management Science, 55(9): 1547-1555. 
Smith, V. L. 1976. Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory. American Economic Review, 
66(2): 274-279. 
----- 1982. Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science. American Economic Review, 72(5): 
923-955. 
Sobek II, D. K., Ward, A. C., Liker, J. K. 1999. Toyota’s Principles of Set-Based Concurrent 
Engineering. Sloan Management Review, 40(2): 67-83. 
Steckel, J. H., Gupta, S., Banerji, A. 2004. Supply Chain Decision Making: Will Shorter Cycle Times 
and Shared Point-of-Sale Information Necessarily Help? Management Science, 50(4): 458-464. 
Sterman, J. D. 1989. Modeling Managerial Behavior: Misperceptions of Feedback in a Dynamic 
Decision Making Experiment. Management Science, 35(3): 321-339. 
Su, X. 2008. Bounded Rationality in Newsvendor Models. Manufacturing & Service Operations 
Management, 10(4): 566-589. 
Taskin, S., Lodree Jr., E. J. 2010. Inventory Decisions for Emergency Supplies Based on Hurricane 
Count Predictions. International Journal of Production Economics, 126(1): 66-75. 
Tatikonda, M. V., Rosenthal, S. R. 2000. Technology Novelty, Project Complexity, and Product 
Development Project Execution Success: A Deeper Look at Task Uncertainty in Product 
Innovation. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 47(1): 74-87. 
103 
Thaler, R. 1980. Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 1(1): 39-60. 
----- 1985. Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice. Marketing Science, 4(3): 199-214. 
Thomas, A. S. 2003. Humanitarian Logistics: Enabling Disaster Response. White Paper, Fritz 
Institute, San Francisco, CA. 
Thomas, A. S., Kopczak, L. R. 2005. From Logistics to Supply Chain Management: The Path Forward 
in the Humanitarian Sector. White Paper, Fritz Institute, San Francisco, CA. 
Thomas, L. J., McClain, J. O., Robinson, L. W., Schultz, K. L. 2007. The Use of Framing in Inventory 
Decisions. Research Paper No. 02-07, Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management, 
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. 
Thomke, S. H. 1998. Managing Experimentation in the Design of New Products. Management 
Science, 44(6): 743-762. 
----- 2008. Learning by Experimentation: Prototyping and Testing. In Loch, C. H., Kavadias, S. (Eds.), 
Handbook of New Product Development Management. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, pp. 401-
420. 
Tong, J., Song, J.-S. 2011. Reference Prices and Transaction Utility in Inventory Decisions. Working 
paper, The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, NC. 
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. 1974. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science, 
185(4157): 1124-1131. 
Wilson, T. D., Gilbert, D. T. 2005. Affective Forecasting: Knowing What to Want. Current Directions 
in Psychological Science, 14(3): 131-134. 
Wu, D. Y., Katok, E. 2006. Learning, Communication, and the Bullwhip Effect. Journal of Operations 
Management, 24(6): 839-850. 
van der Laan, E. A., de Brito, M. P., Vergunst, D. A. 2009. Performance Measurement in 
Humanitarian Supply Chains. International Journal of Risk Assessment and Management, 13(1): 
22-45. 
 
